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  1. The Structure of Criminal Law.Re’em Segev - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (2):497-517.
    According to a common view, criminal law should be structured in a way that allocates the conditions of criminal liability to different types of legal rules, given the content of the condition and the nature of the rule. This view classifies some conditions as elements of offenses and others as (part of) justificatory defenses or of excusatory defenses. While this view is attractive, I argue that it should be rejected, since it is incompatible with two plausible propositions about legal rules. (...)
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  • ‘O Call Me Not to Justify the Wrong’: Criminal Answerability and the Offence/Defence Distinction.Luís Duarte D’Almeida - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2):227-245.
    Most philosophers of criminal law agree that between criminal offences and defences there is a significant, substantial difference. It is a difference, however, that has proved hard to pin down. In recent work, Duff and others have suggested that it mirrors the distinction between criminal answerability and liability to criminal punishment. Offence definitions, says Duff, are—and ought to be—those action-types ‘for which a defendant can properly be called to answer in a criminal court, on pain of conviction and condemnation if (...)
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  • Sex, Reasons, Pro Tanto Wronging, and the Structure of Rape Liability.Kate Greasley - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):159-179.
    Some recent scholarship in the philosophy of criminal law has claimed that sexual penetration ‘per se’—meaning, consensual or otherwise—is pro tanto morally wrong, or that there exist ‘general reasons’ against it. On such a view, penetrative sex is only ever at best justified wrongdoing. When paired with an influential view about the theoretical basis of the offence-defence distinction in criminal law, the apparent implication is that sexual penetration alone ought to constitute the actus reus of rape, with the question of (...)
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