ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin’s criticisms of positive liberty are often read as mere artefacts of his Cold War context. But are they good criticisms? This article evaluates Berlin’s three main worries about positive liberty—the inner-citadel worry, the moralization worry, and the tyranny worry. I find that while they may be reasonable worries to have about any concept of liberty, they are not compelling criticisms of positive liberty in particular.

Na Modernidade filosófica, a expressão sui iuris torna-se comum nos textos políticos, em especial a partir do momento em que uma linguagem dos direitos subjectivos naturais se vai sedimentando e traduzindo uma certa perspectiva da liberdade individual. Assim, sui iuris é considerada expressão de direito designando um âmbito de autonomia ou independência individuais, uma espécie de espaço soberano de um direito pessoal. Em Spinoza, o sui iuris surge com frequência, mas só no Tratado Político atinge a sua máxima expressão, dentro (...) do binómio sui iuris / alterius iuris, o qual é habitualmente identificado com um de autonomia / heteronomia. Tentar-se-á aqui demonstrar que o sui iuris em Spinoza passa por uma transformação radical: não só não é necessariamente incompatível com o alterius iuris, como é-lhe dada uma dimensão epistemológica que se coaduna com uma soteriologia. O sui iuris é então mais uma libertação. (shrink)

In this essay I consider what grounds Spinoza’s defense of the freedom to philosophize, considering why Spinoza doesn’t think that we should attempt to snuff out irrationality and dissolution with the law’s iron fist. In the first section I show that Spinoza eschews skeptical, pluralistic, and rights-based arguments for toleration. I then delineate the prudential, anticlerical roots of Spinoza’s defense, before turning in the final section to consider just how far and when toleration contributes to the guiding norms of governance: (...) peace and empowerment. Once we see how the defense of toleration is anchored in these norms, we form a clearer picture of Spinoza as a liberal perfectionist for whom the bounds of political toleration depends on pragmatic and circumstance-specific assessments of what conduces to the flourishing of the state. This will help to illuminate what is distinctive—and, perhaps, distinctively commendable—about Spinoza’s form of liberalism. (shrink)

While Spinoza’s political philosophy is often described as liberal, it is not always clear what this label means or whether it is warranted. Calling Spinoza ‘liberal’ implies that he belongs to a historical tradition of political philosophers, who formulated and defended claims, which later became identified as central to political liberalism. Consequently, clarifying how Spinoza is a liberal requires specifying precisely which liberal views he articulated and defended. This paper, first, examines the various ways that commentators have interpreted Spinoza as (...) defending liberal commitments. This examination shows that most commentators describe Spinoza as liberal on the grounds that his politics defends the value of individual political freedom, specifically of speech and thought. The paper, second, considers whether he upholds a claim that is important to contemporary liberalism, what is sometimes called the fundamental liberal principle. The paper concludes that Spinoza does not, which suggests that he does not sit as easily in the liberal tradition as some scholars have suggested. (shrink)

There are many places that we must save from destruction. Sadly, they are mostly distant from us. If we accept Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-World, this distance means that we cannot authentically speak of their Being. Even if we 'dwell' in our own lands, we are not 'at home' in these beautiful places. However, if we cannot speak of their Being, of what 'is', how can we ask logging and mining multinationals to stop destroying them? This speechlessness may be overcome with (...) a Whiteheadian process metaphysics, and 'late' Heideggerian poetics. These may then be developed in a concrete community life. (shrink)

The article argues that Spinoza's principle of political order represents a conception of sovereignty which is both historically intelligible and analytically coherent.The appropriateness of four meanings of sovereignty to Spinoza's political theory is considered. Then, after examining Spinoza's use of Hobbes's still influential touchstone for the modern theory of sovereignty, Spinoza's conception is discussed in the light of the role that customary practice and republicanism play in his political theory. The analysis of sovereignty also prompts engagement with a range of (...) meanings of the notions of constitutionalism and absolute rule.The argument demonstrates that while Spinoza employs some different criteria, he establishes a conception of sovereignty which needs to be recognised as no less internally consistent than Hobbes's. Moreover, both conceptions contain problems. Although Hobbes demonstrates the abstract logic of authority, the theoretical consequence he draws concerning sovereignty entailing a unitary state has been successfully challenged. Spinoza's conception of sovereignty is based on the logic of customary practice, but the manner in which customary practice is ultimately unsusceptible of analytical justification renders his notion also vulnerable to challenge. (shrink)