ABSTRACT:Although there is ample evidence that stock markets react negatively to unethical corporate behavior, our understanding of the mechanisms that shape variation in these reactions across different incidents of misconduct remains underdeveloped. We propose and test a framework for explaining this variation by focusing on the role of the media in disseminating initial information about misconduct. We argue that the signaling effects of this information are important for investors because corporations have strong incentives to limit the information they disclose about (...) misconduct. More specifically, we hypothesize that investors are more likely to react negatively when the media presents clear and credible information that misconduct occurred, that the firm was responsible for it, and that the misconduct was the result of deeper organizational problems. We also predict that information which signals that a firm has restorative capacity tempers investor reactions when the media places blame for misconduct on the corporation rather than specific individuals. We test our hypotheses in a unique sample of 345 acts of corporate misconduct in five European countries. Our findings provide broad support for our hypotheses, and we discuss implications for research on corporate misconduct and the role of non-state actors in regulating unethical corporate behavior. (shrink)

In response to demand from investors and other stakeholders, companies have increased voluntary disclosure of climate change-related policies and performance. Information intermediaries have correspondingly emerged to provide needed credibility and commensurability of climate disclosures. However, the provision of performance ratings and lax audit capabilities creates opportunities for firms to manipulate those ratings for impression management. This article explains how firms may attain an intermediary’s favorable assessment of climate performance using varied methods of strategic disclosure. Using data from a prominent climate (...) intermediary (CDP, formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), I find that strategic disclosure is widespread and effective in attaining higher ratings, particularly through disclosure of forward-looking factors, suggesting that ratings may not be an accurate indicator of a firm’s true underlying performance. This article contributes to commensuration and impression management literatures, offers guidance for mechanism design to improve the reliability of intermediated voluntary disclosure, and highlights important areas for future research. (shrink)

This study expands the application of deonance theory into organizations’ upper echelons by examining how CEOs imprinted with a sense of duty can influence managerial decision-making. We hypothesize an imprint of bounded autonomy, an ought-force that constrains their decision-making and understanding of behavioral freedom, influences duty-bound CEOs to self-report errors in past financial reporting. We test deonance theory propositions of instrumentality for behavioral expansion, namely loss avoidance and gain attainment, related to institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership. We use (...) CEOs that are graduates of U.S. service academies as a proxy for duty-bound executives and find firms they lead are more likely to issue a financial restatement to correct a previous reporting error. This finding is robust to alternate explanations such as being error-prone, earnings management, auditor oversight, and risk behaviors. We also find evidence that deonance may be subject to behavioral expansion. The likelihood of issuing a restatement decreases as institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership increases. This study shows imprinted deonance within the C-suite influences important organizational outcomes. (shrink)