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  1. Speaker’s Intentions, Ambiguous Demonstrations, and Relativist Semantics for Demonstratives.Jakub Rudnicki - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):2085-2111.
    In this paper, I do four things. First, I argue that Recanati’s recent argument for intentionalist semantics for demonstratives is erroneous. I do this partly by suggesting that demonstrations should be treated as features of Kaplanian context. Second, I explain why the classic ambiguity objection against conventionalist positions regarding demonstratives is not in any way less problematic for intentionalism. Third, I propose a novel semantic framework for demonstratives that is able to simultaneously explain the appeal of some prominent conventionalist and (...)
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  • Referential/attributive: a scope interpretation.Richard L. Mendelsohn - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):167-191.
    There is a core to the referential/attributive distinction that reveals a propositional ambiguity that is scope-related and rooted in syntax.
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  • Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.
    Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form 'will(φ)', that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd's analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further (...)
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  • Review of Kronfeld (1990): Reference and Computation: An Essay in Applied Philosophy of Language. [REVIEW]Rod Bertolet - 1998 - Pragmatics and Cognition 6 (1-2):339-348.
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  • A Stereotype Semantics for Syntactically Ambiguous Slurs.Eleonora Orlando & Andrés Saab - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):101-129.
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  • Against predicativism about names.Jeonggyu Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):243-261.
    According to predicativism about names, names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. In this paper, I shall argue that these bare singular names do not have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. I will present three objections to predicativism—the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections—and show that they succeed even against the more sophisticated versions of predicativism defended by Fara and Bach.
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  • Reference, De Re Belief and Rigidity.D. A. Griffiths - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):677-692.
    Both the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs, and the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions have seemed, to some philosophers, to be of somewhat dubious status. While admitting that there is, in each case, some sort of distinction to be drawn, they have been inclined to think that these distinctions are not relevant to the philosophical questions being asked about beliefs and descriptions. Philosophers have, for example, been concerned with the structure of beliefs, where (...)
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  • The attributive/referential distinction, pragmatics, modularity of mind and modularization.Alessandro Capone - 2011 - Australian Journal of Linguistics 31 (2): 153-186.
    attributive/referential. Pragmatic intrusion.
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  • Reference, De Re Belief and Rigidity.D. A. Griffiths - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):677 - 692.
    Both the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs, and the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions have seemed, to some philosophers, to be of somewhat dubious status. While admitting that there is, in each case, some sort of distinction to be drawn, they have been inclined to think that these distinctions are not relevant to the philosophical questions being asked about beliefs and descriptions. Philosophers have, for example, been concerned with the structure of beliefs, where (...)
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  • Reference and incomplete descriptions.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1669-1687.
    In “On Referring” Peter Strawson pointed out that incomplete descriptions pose a problem for Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions. Howard Wettstein and Michael Devitt appealed to incomplete descriptions to argue, first, that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions fails, and second, that Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction has semantic bite. Stephen Neale has defended Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions against Wettstein’s and Devitt’s objections. In this paper, my aim is twofold. First, I rebut Neale’s objections to Wettstein’s and Devitt’s argument and argue that (...)
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  • Lowe on a posteriori essentialism.Alexander Bird - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):336-344.
    1.Following Kripke, many philosophers have accepted the existence of propositions concerning essences, and, more generally, propositions asserting necessities, that are knowable only a posteriori. Such an acceptance is consistent with the claim that ultimately all knowledge of necessity is a priori. A posteriori knowledge of necessity may be held to be a consequence of the combination of a priori knowledge of a proposition asserting essence or necessity with a posteriori knowledge of a non-modal proposition. E. J. Lowe (2007: 287–88) denies (...)
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  • Descriptions and uniqueness.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):29-57.
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  • Quantification and context.Marga Reimer - 1998 - Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (1):95-115.
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  • Donnellan's distinction/Kripke's test.M. Reimer - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):89-100.
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  • General terms and rigidity: another solution to the trivialization problem.Eleonora Orlando - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (1):49-80.
    In this paper I am concerned with the problem of applying the notion of rigidity to general terms. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke has clearly suggested that we should include some general terms among the rigid ones, namely, those common nouns semantically correlated with natural substances, species and phenomena, in general, natural kinds -'water', 'tiger', 'heat'- and some adjectives -'red', 'hot', 'loud'. However, the notion of rigidity has been defined for singular terms; after all, the notion that Kripke has provided (...)
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  • Compositional names.Stephan J. Mccaffery - 1999 - Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):423-445.
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  • Intrinsic Reference and the New Theory.Laird Addis - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):241-257.
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  • Donnellan's distinctions.Rod Bertolet - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):477 – 487.
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  • Kaip Apibrėžiamosios Deskripcijos Vartojamos Singuliariniams Teiginiams Išreikšti?Evgeny Borisov - 2014 - Problemos 85:130-140.
    Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį. Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis. Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame (...)
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