In recent years, research on morality in organizational life has begun to examine how organizational conduct comes to be socially constructed as having failed to comply with a community’s accepted morals. Researchers in this stream of research, however, have paid little attention to identifying and theorizing the key actors involved in these social construction processes and the types of accounts they construct. In this paper, we explore a set of key structural and cultural dimensions of apparent noncompliance that enable us (...) to distinguish between four categories of actors who engage in constructing the label of moral failure: dominant insiders, watchdog organizations, professional members, and publics. The analysis further clarifies which category of actor is more likely to succeed in constructing the label of moral failure under which circumstances, and what accounts they are likely to use, namely scapegoating, prototyping, shaming, and protesting. (shrink)

Recent history reveals a series of rogue traders, jeopardizing their employers’ assets and reputation. There have been instances of unauthorized acting in concert between traders, their supervisors and/or firms’ decision makers and executives, resulting in collusive rogue trading. We explore organizational misbehaviour theory and explain three major collusive rogue trading events at National Australia Bank, JPMorgan with its London Whale and the interest reference rate manipulation/LIBOR scandal through a descriptive model of organizational/structural, individual and group forces. Our model draws conclusions (...) on how banks can set up behavioural risk management and internal control frameworks to mitigate potential collusive rogue trading. (shrink)

AbstractEnduring unethical behavior in trading has generated much research interest, and scholars disagree on the reasons for this situation. According to MacIntyre (2015), this has to do with the personal traits of traders, whereas Rocchi and Thunder (2019) argue this is due to permissive work environment that can potentially be changed to favoring ethical trading. We contribute to this debate by exploring how interactions between organizational culture and management control systems (MCSs) may affect the enduring unethical behaviors of traders. We (...) conceptualize this with the concepts of organized hypocrisy (Brunsson 1986, 1989, 1993) and decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977). An in-depth case study of fraud (Jerome Kerviel at Societe Generale), informs the empirical inquiry. We develop the concept of organized decoupling to characterize how the MCSs are articulated with the organizational culture favoring unethical behavior, while being used as a ‘safety mechanism’ to manage the legal and reputational risk of the bank. The analysis highlights three key features of the organized decoupling of MCS: physical distance, technical distance and social distance. The study contribution lies in showing that decoupling is not only emergent but might be intended and therefore organized. The findings also raise doubts on the role of MCSs in monitoring trading activities as presented by investment banking institutions and regulators, suggesting more organized hypocrisy, and raising significant concerns regarding the creation of tolerable work environment welcoming ethical behaviors in the investment banking sector. (shrink)