Michael Hand argues that at least some moral standards can be robustly justified and that because of this educators can legitimately cultivate subscription to t.

Matthew Clayton, David Stevens and Laura D’Olimpio have advanced a series of objections to arguments I set out in my recent book A Theory of Moral Education – in particular to the problem-of-sociality justification for basic moral standards. Here I reply to their objections.

In the foregoing articles, David Aldridge, Doret de Ruyter and John Tillson offer some weighty and wide-ranging criticisms of my recent book, A Theory of Moral Education (Hand, 2018a). I cannot hope to do justice to the detail of their criticisms in the space available to me, but I shall attempt, in what follows, to defend my account of moral education against their principal lines of attack. I am grateful to Aldridge, de Ruyter and Tillson for their close engagement with (...) the book and for the opportunity their objections afford me to clarify aspects of my argument. (shrink)

Francis Dunlop; The Rational-Liberal Neglect of Human Nature, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–119, https://doi.or.