Feminist literature on care has extensively addressed inequalities that cut across the social categories of gender, class and ethnicity in relation to care work. One category that has received less attention in theories of caregiving so far is age. Built on the feminist literature of care and taking young (female) carers as its subject matter, this article tackles age as a third social category of intersectional inequalities along with class and gender. Firstly, through dealing with Nancy Fraser’s justice framework of (...) participatory parity, it is argued that addressing the intersectional inequalities that young (female) carers face necessitates a justice framework that contemplates both the distributional and recognitional aspects of care. In this respect a dual conceptualisation of care is presented – both as a social good and a social process. Secondly, a critical analysis will be presented of the elements of the justice framework of Fraser, where the notion of subordinated status will be related to the identities of young carers. Lastly, the normative framework participatory parity will be discussed in relation to the politics of need, as care practices define the needs of young carers that are contextualised in the care processes, but also in a childhood space. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the EU endorsement, so far Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is discussed as regards its definition, its features and its conceptual core: innovation and responsibility. This conceptual indeterminacy is a source of disagreements at the political level, giving rise to a plurality of outcomes and versions upheld within the same model of governance. Following a Charles Taylor’s suggestion, this conceptual opening of the RRI model can be explained by the existence of plural, clashing moral frameworks: discourse ethics, Aristotelian ethics, (...) care ethics, dignitarian ethics, rights-based moralities etc. Given the diffusion in the RRI literature of references to care ethics and its justification of participation and responsibility, I will compare the conceptual premises of this philosophical line with those of ethics of rights, which have been criticised by advocates of care ethics. I will argue that public engagement based on only needs cannot lead to responsible outcomes since it produces however the exclusion of some needs, covered instead by rights. In order for participation to be effective, rights or an alliance between the two perspectives is required. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is not to provide an overall picture of care ethics, but, rather, to reflect upon the concept of care, which has gained significance in particular scientific contexts. Undoubtedly, the importance of the subject of care represents a challenge on the level of fundamental philosophical positions and a diversified look into the occurring forms of the psychological and social suffering, dependency, and vulnerability. I will shed light on tenets that are considered central to the care ethics (...) and that have led to the setting up of the relationship between care and democracy. By introducing the basic aspects of Carol Gilligan’s and Joan Tronto’s theories, I will emphasize their vocation to be politically relevant. A discussion on the relationship between care and justice on the one hand, and needs and rights on the other, will follow. Can hearing voices of care make democracy more just? How can care ethics provide a concrete support for democracy? On the political level, care ethics builds on the assumptions of the necessary relatedness and equality between individuals who are decisive in the light of the welfare state perspective. Upon closer examination, one may see that the setting up of these relationships is not new to the liberal perspective. Liberalism is historically rooted in the fundamental interconnection between freedom and equality. Virtues such as care and meekness can be formulated in the language of politics, but they still remain unpolitical. On the one hand, engaging in a critical reflection upon such virtues might be an indispensable measuring instrument for distinguishing a good democracy from a bad one. On the other hand, care ethics does not prove to be a real alternative to the ethics of justice. In this regard, care ethics seems to show its feet of clay. (shrink)

How ought we to respond to strangers in imminent need? Many people suggest that we need justice to temper the partiality of care. In this paper 1 argue that neither care nor justice adequately motivates attention to the suffering of strangers. Rather, a different virtue, compassion grounded in equanimity, is required. I demonstrate that the virtue of compassion alhws the agent to sustain her engagement with suffering strangers without sacrificing her own flourishing.

Some Romanian feminist scholars argue that welfare policies of post-communist states are deeply unjust to women and preclude them from reaching economic autonomy. The upshot of this argument is that liberal economic policy would advance feminist goals better than the welfare state. How should we read this dissonance between Western and some Eastern feminist scholarship concerning distributive justice? I identify the problem of dependency at the core of a possible debate about feminism and welfare. Worries about how decades of communism (...) have shaped citizenry feed feminists' suspicion of the welfare state and fears of paternalist policies. I criticize the arguments in favour of neoliberal policies and I suggest a crucial distinction between legitimate, universal forms of human dependency and dependencies that result from particular social arrangements. (shrink)

ABSTRACT People who are paid to provide basic care for others are frequently undervalued, exploited and expected to reach often unrealistic standards of care. I argue that appropriate social recognition, support and fair pay for people who provide care for those who are disabled, frail and aged, or suffering ill health that impedes their capacity to negotiate daily activities without support, depends on a reconsideration of the paradigm of the citizen or and moral agent. I argue that by drawing on (...) the ideas of human vulnerability and dependency as central to our personhood, a more realistic conception of selves, citizens and persons can be developed that better recognises the inevitability of human dependency and the social value of care work. I also indicate the significance of this vulnerability‐focussed view for ethical evaluation of the emotional aspects of care relationships. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to the criticisms of my ideas made by Christopher Groves in his piece “Logic of Choice or Logic of Care? Uncertainty, Technological Mediation and Responsible Innovation”, which was published in this journal. In my refutation of his objections, I firstly argue that, thanks to the work of the European Court of Human Rights, human rights are continuously evolving in Europe and therefore constitute a framework that is open to the future. Secondly, I argue that, through (...) codes of conduct, guidelines, etc., human rights give rise to moral practices, for example in the business sphere, and that they are not abstract and universal like natural rights, but contextual and actuated at the world-regional level, in particular. Finally, I show that a human rights framework is more effective than an ethics of care when it comes to dealing with certain aspects of intergenerational relationships, such as genetic enhancement in humans. (shrink)

Choice over home care has become an important pillar in the provision of publicly financed long-term care for people of all ages. In many European welfare states, cash-for-care schemes give care recipients greater choice over home care arrangements by allowing them to pay for care provided by acquaintances, friends and even family members. Paying for such informal care, however, is increasingly contested due to growing care needs, rising costs and the perceived need to tighten access to publicly funded care. Citizens (...) in paid care-giving roles are thus pressured to continue their care unpaid or re-divide their care-giving responsibilities with lay ?citizen-carers?. On the basis of a Dutch case study, this article examines how paid family care-givers experience this call for greater self-sufficiency in providing care. An analysis of 25 interviews and 21 letters of complaint revealed that care-givers felt trapped between their desire to derive social status from paid work and their inability to reject or re-divide previously paid care responsibilities. In a society where all citizens are expected to work, care-givers feel that their previously paid care-giving is devalued from a public to a private matter, despite the government's attempts to reframe care as an act of good citizenship. (shrink)

Old age often brings with it chronic conditions that make it difficult to handle the activities of daily life. In the United States, unpaid family caregivers, predominantly women, provide most of this care. I explore why this situation has come about and persists and further ground my image of a dystopian future in neoliberalism, the policymaking process, and contemporary politics. I then offer an ethical and policy foundation for an alternative approach to providing needed long-term care services and make provisional (...) suggestions for actions that ought to be taken now and in the near future to avoid this dystopian future. (shrink)