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  1. Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize (...)
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  • Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:1-17.
    The present paper proposes an integrative account of social forms of practical irrationality and corresponding disruptions of individual and group-level emotion regulation. I will especially focus on disruptions in emotion regulation by means of collaborative agential and doxastic akrasia. I begin by distinguishing mutual, communal and collaborative forms of akrasia. Such a taxonomy seems all the more needed as, rather surprisingly, in the face of huge philosophical interest in analysing the possibility, structure and mechanisms of individual practical irrationality, with very (...)
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  • To ‘ideology, first‐person authority, and self‐deception’.William Whisner - 1994 - Social Epistemology 8 (2):199 – 213.
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  • Overcoming rationalization and self‐deception: The cultivation of critical thinking.William Whisner - 1993 - Educational Theory 43 (3):309-321.
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