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  1. The Functions of Diagnoses in Medicine and Psychiatry.Hane Htut Maung - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 507-526.
    Diagnoses are central to the practice of medicine, where they serve a variety of functions for clinicians, patients, and society. They aid communication, explain symptoms, inform predictions, guide therapeutic interventions, legitimize sickness, and authorize access to resources. Insofar as psychiatry is a discipline whose practice is shaped by medical conventions, its diagnoses are sometimes presented as if they serve the same sorts of function as diagnoses in bodily medicine. However, there are philosophical problems that cast doubt on whether the functions (...)
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  • The Quantitative Problem for Theories of Dysfunction and Disease.Thomas Schramme - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(SI7)5-30.
    Mnoge biološke funkcije dopuštaju stupnjevanje. Na primjer, lučenje određenog hormona u organizmu može biti na višoj ili nižoj razini, u usporedbi s istim organizmom drugom prilikom ili u usporedbi s drugim organizmima. Koje razine funkcioniranja predstavljaju slučajeve disfunkcije; gdje da povučemo crtu? To je kvantitativni problem za teorije disfunkcije i bolesti. Cilj mi je braniti verziju bioloških teorija disfunkcije kako bih se uhvatio u koštac s ovim problemom. Međutim, također ću dopustiti da evaluativna razmatranja uđu u teoriju bolesti. Moj argument (...)
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  • Principles behind definitions of diseases – a criticism of the principle of disease mechanism and the development of a pragmatic alternative.Morten Severinsen - 2001 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (4):319-336.
    Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective'' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism (...)
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  • The Causal Explanatory Functions of Medical Diagnoses.Hane Htut Maung - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (1):41-59.
    Diagnoses in medicine are often taken to serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms and signs. This article examines how they do so. I begin by arguing that although some instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, they are explanatory neither in virtue of their argumentative structures nor in virtue of general regularities between diagnoses and clinical presentations. I then consider the theory that medical diagnoses explain symptoms and signs by identifying their actual causes in particular cases. (...)
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  • Medical ethics: who decides what?M. Kottow - 1983 - Journal of Medical Ethics 9 (2):105-108.
    The FME symposium on teaching medical ethics takes up the issue of competence and responsibility in matters concerning bioethics (1). Foreseeably, the medical participants argue that physicians are prepared, or can be easily prepared, to handle all relevant aspects of medical ethics. The contrary position is sustained by the philosophically trained participants, who believe that physicians do not, in fact cannot, sufficiently manage medico-ethical problems. This paper sees a role for both parties. Medical ethicists should properly be involved in medical (...)
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  • Classical medicine v alternative medical practices.M. H. Kottow - 1992 - Journal of Medical Ethics 18 (1):18-22.
    Classical medicine operates in a climate of rational discourse, scientific knowledge accretion and the acceptance of ethical standards that regulate its activities. Criticism has centred on the excessive technological emphasis of modern medicine and on its social strategy aimed at defending exclusiveness and the privileges of professional status. Alternative therapeutic approaches have taken advantage of the eroded public image of medicine, offering treatments based on holistic philosophies that stress the non-rational, non-technical and non-scientific approach to the unwell, disregarding traditional diagnostic (...)
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  • Dis-ease or Disease? Ontological Rarefaction in the Medical-Industrial Complex.S. Scott Graham - 2011 - Journal of Medical Humanities 32 (3):167-186.
    Recent scholarship in medical humanities has expressed strong concern over the ability of pharmaceuticals companies to medicalize discomfort and subsequently invent diseases. In this article, I explore the clinical debates over the ontology of the sinus headache as a possible counter-case. Extending Foucault’s concept of principles or rarefaction, this paper documents the efforts of clinicians to resist the pharmaceutically-provided understanding of the sinus headache. In so doing, it offers institutions of rarefaction and rarefactive assemblages as useful heuristics for the exploration (...)
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