Switch to: References

Citations of:

What Kind of Beings are Dolphins?

In In Defense of Dolphins. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 155–184 (2007)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Nonhuman Primates, Human Need, and Ethical Constraints.David DeGrazia - 2016 - Hastings Center Report 46 (4):27-28.
    “The Ethics of Infection Challenges in Primates,” by Anne Barnhill, Steven Joffe, and Franklin Miller, is an exceptionally timely contribution to the literature on animal research ethics. Animal research has long been both a source of high hopes and a cause for moral concern. When it comes to infection challenge studies with nonhuman primates, neither the hope—to save thousands of human lives from such diseases as Ebola and Marburg—nor the concern—the conviction that primates deserve especially strong protections—could be much higher. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Dependent relationships and the moral standing of nonhuman animals.Andrew I. Cohen - 2008 - Ethics and the Environment 13 (2):pp. 1-21.
    This essay explores whether dependent relationships might justify extending direct moral consideration to nonhuman animals. After setting out a formal conception of moral standing as relational, scalar, and unilateral, I consider whether and how an appeal to dependencies might be the basis for an animal’s moral standing. If dependencies generate reasons for extending direct moral consideration, such reasons will admit of significant variations in scope and stringency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Can Animals Judge?Hans-Johann Glock - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):11-33.
    This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds (section 1), and presents a ‘lingualist master argument’ according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language (section 2). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of wholes – propositions – and the idea (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations