In this article I investigate the nature and extent of filial obligations. The question what (adult) children owe their parents is not only philosophically interesting, but also of increasing relevance in ageing societies. Its answer matters to elderly people and their adult children, and is relevant to social policy issues in various ways. I present the strongest arguments for and against three models of filial obligations: the ‘past parental sacrifices’ model, the ‘special relationship’ model, and the conventionalist model. There is (...) something to be said—and after consideration of objections something remains to be said—for all three models. In other words: filial obligations have more than one source, and an adequate model of filial obligations should reflect this. On its own, each of the above models is one-sided. They also fail to show the connections between the question of filial obligations and various other issues, such as issues of gender justice, the extent of institutionalization of eldercare, and social conventions regarding filial responsibility. Therefore, I integrate what I think we should keep from the aforementioned models into a contextual, pluralist model, which places filial obligations in a broader social and cultural context and relates them to issues of social justice. The model also highlights the difference between general and specific filial obligations, and the factors that determine their nature and extent, thus enabling a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of filial obligations. (shrink)

How much should adult children sacrifice to care for their chronically ill parents? If parents commit crimes, should their children report them to the authorities? What are the demands of filial obligation in these cases? Traditionally, Confucians have favoured a somewhat stringent view of filial obligation. By this view, adult children have to provide long‐term care to their parents as well as place their parents' interests over any concerns of justice, should the two happen to conflict. I will call these (...) stringent views the principles of filial caregiving and filial favoritism. In this paper, I will use Scanlon's Contractualism to analyze the two principles, and juxtapose the Contractualist analysis with the Confucian filial piety. By doing this, we sharpen Confucianism's critical elements, and highlight the coherence of Contractualism with this ethical ideology from a non‐analytic tradition. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of (...) relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child s being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent s being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory. (shrink)

One might think that parental obligation to children ends with the end of childhood. I argue that if we consider why parents are obligated to their children, we will see that this view is false. Creating children exposes them to life’s risks. When we expose others to risks, we are often obligated to minimize damages and compensate for harms. Life’s risks last a lifetime, therefore parental obligation to one’s children does too. Grown children’s autonomy, and grown children’s independent responsibility for (...) some of their own problems, can sometimes limit what parental responsibility demands of parents but it doesn’t do away with the responsibility. I argue that my conclusions are not as counterintuitive as they might initially seem. I also consider the implications that parental obligation to grown children might have on the oft assumed obligation that grown children have to care for their parents. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einem im Februar 2014 ergangenen BGH-Urteil, das die Unterhaltspflicht von erwachsenen Kindern gegenüber ihren Eltern auch im Falle des einseitigen Kontaktabbruchs bejaht, werden in diesem Beitrag Überlegungen zur Struktur und den normativen Implikationen der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung angestellt. Zum einen wird dafür plädiert, die Eltern-Kind-Beziehung als nichtsymmetrisch, d. h. als Komplex aus symmetrischen und asymmetrischen Beziehungen zu verstehen. Zum anderen wird hinsichtlich der normativen Implikationen der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung dafür argumentiert, dass Verpflichtungen innerhalb dieser Beziehung nicht vom bloßen Bestehen, sondern vom Wert (...) der Beziehung abhängig zu machen sind. Aus diesem Argument wird gefolgert, dass die im BGH-Urteil sowie im in der einschlägigen Literatur diskutierten „Past Parental Sacrifices Model“ unterstellte Symmetrie der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung zu einer inadäquaten normativen Analyse führt. Damit wird der Rechtfertigungsstrategie filialer Verpflichtungen, die auf ein Quidproquo bezüglich zurückliegender elterlicher Versorgungsleistungen gestützt ist, eine Absage erteilt. (shrink)

Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in structure and content from any that we are likely to share (...) with anyone apart from a parent. A more promising account will concentrate on what is unique about the parent-child relationship. I articulate and defend the 'special goods theory', according to which filial duties arise from the distinctive kinds of goods that healthy parent-child relationships typically involve. (shrink)

A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question what filial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories of filial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust to those (...) on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To compare filial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’ expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis for filial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. (shrink)

Bis vor wenigen Jahren hätte ein Beitrag zur Familienethik mit einem Hinweis darauf begonnen, dass es sich dabei um ein philosophisches Forschungsdesiderat handelt. In der Zwischenzeit hat sich die Situation merklich verändert: Zahlreiche Sammelbände, Monographien und Aufsätze zeugen davon, dass sich die Familienethik zunehmender Beachtung erfreut und die Beziehung zwischen Eltern und Kindern ebenso wie die Rechte und Pflichten von Eltern und Kindern untereinander eine eingehendere Analyse verdienen. In dieser Einleitung werden einige gesellschaftliche und innerphilosophische Entwicklungen skizziert, die zur zunehmenden (...) Beachtung der Familienethik geführt haben. Darüber hinaus wird ein Überblick über die Beiträge des Schwerpunktes gegeben. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that many, if not most, adult children have moral duties to visit their parents when they can do so at reasonable cost. However, whether such duties persist when the parents lose the ability to recognise their children, usually due to dementia, is more controversial. Over 40% of respondents in a public survey from the British Alzheimer’s Society said that it was “pointless” to keep up contact at this stage. Insofar as one cannot be morally required to (...) do pointless things, this would suggest that children are relieved of any duties to visit their parents. In what appears to be the only scholarly treatment of this issue, Claudia Mills has defended this view, arguing that our duties to visit our parents require a type of relationship that is lost when parents no longer remember who their children are. This article challenges Mills’ argument. Not only can children be duty-bound to visit parents who have lost the ability to recognise them, I argue that many children do in fact have such duties. As I show, these duties are grounded in any special interests that their parents have in their company; the fact that visiting their parents might allow them to comply with generic duties of sociability; and/or the fact that such visits allow them to express any gratitude that they owe their parents. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Frage, ob erwachsene Kinder ihren Eltern als deren Kinder etwas schulden. Ich argumentiere, dass sich entsprechende filiale Pflichten nicht begründen lassen, und zwar weder i.) mit Verweis auf Güter, die Kinder im Laufe ihrer Kindheit von ihren Eltern erhalten haben, noch ii.) vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Beziehung zwischen Eltern und ihren erwachsenen Kindern, noch iii.) mit Blick auf das positive Potential dieses Verhältnisses für Eltern wie Kinder. Zwar haben Kinder also keine filialen Pflichten, doch sind (...) sie iv.) dennoch in ihrer filialen Freiheit eingeschränkt. Diese Einschränkung ergibt sich aus der speziellen relationalen Vulnerabilität, welche die Eltern-Kind-Beziehung prägt und die Kindern Grund gibt, sich in ihrem Verhalten ihren eigenen Eltern gegenüber von dieser Verletzlichkeit leiten zu lassen und auf sie Rücksicht zu nehmen. (shrink)