In this commentary, we criticize the argument that allowing euthanasia for people with disabilities is ableist. We analyze the distinction between facts and values in medical assistance in dying, the expressivist objection, and the problem of crypwashing.

In their paper titledChoosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,Wiebe and Mullin argue against the stance of diminished autonomy in chronically ill, disabled patients living in unjust sociopolitical environments who pursue medical assistance in dying (MAiD). They suggest that it would be paternalistic to deny these people this choice and conclude that MAiD should actually be seen as a form of harm reduction for them.This response to their article argues that basing discussions surrounding this important topic on (...) a single bioethical concept does not address the needs of this cohort and is restrictively siloed. The discussion should include considerations of human rights and the need for legislative reforms to address social conditions, in addition to traditional bioethical principles. Work in this area needs to become interdisciplinary and collaborative as well as integrate input from the patients themselves. The concept of the dignity of these patients, in its broadest sense, needs to be infused into the discussion in order to optimise the exploration for solutions for this cohort.The stance of MAiD as harm reduction, in this context, does not meet the definition of harm reduction, nor does it represent a commitment to the best interests of these patients. (shrink)

By the time this essay is published, it will be a matter of weeks before doctors and nurse practitioners in Canada can legally end the lives (by medical assistance in dying, or MAID) of non-dying p...

In the paper, titled ‘Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,’ Wiebe and Mullin argue that people living in unjust social conditions are sufficiently autonomous to request medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The ethical issue is that some people may request MAiD primarily because of unjust social conditions, not their illness, disease, disability or decline in capability. It is easily agreed that people living in unjust social conditions can be autonomous. Nevertheless, Wiebe and Mullin fail to appreciate (...) that autonomy is only a necessary condition for MAiD. In addition to autonomy, one must decide that providing assisted dying to a patient because they are living in unjust social conditions is ethical. Central to making this ethical decision is the principle of non-maleficence, famously articulated as ‘do no harm.’ The authors admit that performing MAiD in response to unjust social circumstances is harmful, but they justify this harmful action by appealing to the principle of harm reduction. A fundamental flaw of their approach is that it relies on the legislative definition of intolerable suffering, which is based on circular reasoning and given that 99.2% of patients that have applied for MAiD satisfied this criterion, it is essentially equivalent to no standard/criterion. Canadian society is struggling with the ethical implications of its permissive MAiD programme, and, fundamental to this debate, will be determining the proper balance between autonomy and non-maleficence for people living in unjust social conditions. (shrink)

Enduring intolerable suffering, an essential eligibility criterion in Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) in Canada and elsewhere, is a contradiction in terms, in that suffering must be tolerable to be endured. Cases of people who were approved for MAiD but who elected to die naturally, thus tolerating their suffering, bear out the unreliability of this central safeguard. The clinical assessment of intolerable suffering may be strengthened by adopting a definition of intolerable suffering centred on clinically evidenced physical and psychological decompensation. (...) This argument also raises important questions about the risks of MAiD clinicians subjectively defining, approving and providing MAiD in ways that deviate from accepted legal and clinical concepts and ethics. Examples show some prolific clinicians describe MAiD in terminology that differs from such norms, as a personal mission, as personally pleasurable, and as a rights-based service. These alternative views are explored for their risks in assessing and providing MAiD for intolerable suffering. This further demonstrates the need for conceptual clarity in legislation, improved vetting and monitoring of clinicians, and a different assessment process to protect patients and clinicians. (shrink)

The Canadian approach to assisted dying, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), as of early 2024, is assessed for its ability to protect patients from criminal healthcare serial killing (HSK) to evaluate the strength of its safeguards. MAiD occurs through euthanasia or self-administered assisted suicide (EAS) and is legal or considered in many countries and jurisdictions. Clinicians involved in HSK typically target patients with the same clinical features as MAiD-eligible patients. They may draw on similar rationales, e.g., to end perceived patient (...) suffering and provide pleasure for the clinician. HSK can remain undetected or unconfirmed for considerable periods owing to a lack of staff background checks, poor surveillance and oversight, and a failure by authorities to act on concerns from colleagues, patients, or witnesses. The Canadian MAiD system, effectively euthanasia-based, has similar features with added opportunities for killing afforded by clinicians’ exemption from criminal culpability for homicide and assisted suicide offences amid broad patient eligibility criteria. An assessment of the Canadian model offers insights for enhancing safeguards and detecting abuses in there and other jurisdictions with or considering legal EAS. Short of an unlikely recriminalization of EAS, better clinical safeguarding measures, standards, vetting and training of those involved in MAiD, and a radical restructuring of its oversight and delivery can help mitigate the possibility of abuses in a system mandated to accommodate homicidal clinicians. (shrink)