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Against naive mentalism

Metaphilosophy (October) 281 (October):281-291 (1991)

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  1. Demotivating Intentional Mentalism.Joachim Lipski - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):298-318.
    Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
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