Pharmaceutical companies routinely engage physicians, particularly those with prestigious academic credentials, to deliver “educational” talks to groups of physicians in the community to help market the company's brand-name drugs.Although presented as educational, and even though they provide educational content, these events are intended to influence decisions about drug selection in ways that are not based on the suitability and effectiveness of the product, but on the prestige and persuasiveness of the speaker. A number of state legislatures and most academic medical (...) centers have attempted to restrict physician participation in pharmaceutical marketing activities, though most restrictions are not absolute and have proven difficult to enforce. This article reviews the literature on why Speakers' Bureaus have become a lightning rod for academic/industry conflicts of interest and examines the arguments of those who defend physician participation. It considers whether the restrictions on Speakers' Bureaus are consistent with principles of academic freedom and concludes with the legal and institutional efforts to manage industry speaking. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical companies routinely engage physicians, particularly those with prestigious academic credentials, to deliver educational talks to groups of physicians in the community to help market the company's brand-name drugs. These speakers receive substantial compensation to lecture at events sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, a practice that has garnered attention, controversy, and scrutiny in recent years from legislators, professional associations, researchers, and ethicists on the issue of whether it is appropriate for academic physicians to serve in a promotional role. These relationships have (...) become so contentious that three years ago the pharmaceutical industry trade association, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, adopted voluntary guidelines stating that drug companies should stop giving doctors free pens, calendars, sports bags, or tickets to entertainment events. Further, numerous medical associations, such as the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Board of Internal Medicine and the Institute on Medicine as a Profession, and government bodies such as the Institute of Medicine have recommended that medical schools and teaching hospitals prohibit or strongly discourage faculty from participating in so-called industry Speakers Bureaus — promotional events designed solely to market pharmaceutical products. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest in health and medicine have been the source of considerable public and professional debate. Much of this debate has focused on financial, rather than non-financial COI, which is a significant lacuna because non-financial COI can be just as influential as financial COI. In an effort to explore the nature and effects of non-financial, as well as financial COI, we conducted semi-structured interviews with eleven Australian medical professionals regarding their experiences of, and attitudes towards, COI. We found that (...) this group of medical professionals saw non-financial interests—most notably the pursuit of status and respect and the avoidance of stigma—as potentially conflicting with other important interests. (shrink)

Concern about financial conflicts crowds out sufficient consideration of other interests that may bias research conduct. Regulations, institutional policies, and guidance from professional bodies and medical journals all primarily focus on financial ties. But why? Economic gain is not the only powerful influence. This article argues that we under-prioritize non-financial interests in the regulation of medical research. It critiques the usual reasons given for regulating financial and non-financial interests differently — that the interests contrast in terms of tangibility, that financial (...) interests are optional, and that financial interests can be efficiently carved out as a discrete area of focus. Moreover, disparate regulatory treatment seems inattentive to the very similar social and psychological forces that animate the bias effect of both financial and non-financial interests and fails to account for how financial and non-financial interests synergistically interact. Under-prioritization of non-financial interests threatens to erode public trust and creates negative spillover effects that weaken financial conflicts regulation. Optimal regulation requires a more integrated, balanced, and proportionate response to secondary interests in medical research. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest have been reduced to financial conflicts. The National Institutes of Health’s new rules for managing conflicts of interest in medical research, the first major change to the regulations in over 15 years, address only financial ties. Although several commentators urged that the regulations also cover non-financial interests, the Department of Health and Human Services declined to do so. Similarly, the Institute of Medicine’s influential 2009 Conflict of Interest Report focuses almost exclusively on financial conflicts. Institutional policies at (...) academic medical centers and guidance from professional bodies and medical journals also primarily emphasize financial ties. Even broadly worded rules are applied more readily to financial ties than non-financial interests, such as the regulations that restrict institutional review board members with conflicting interests from participating in protocol reviews. (shrink)

The case study presented by Winch and Sinnott (2011) shows not only how difficult it is for clinicians and researchers to identify conflicts of interest (COI), but also how damaging it can be when there are unin- formed and uncoordinated policy responses by senior administrators.

Background: In biomedical research, there have been numerous scandals highlighting conflicts of interest (COIs) leading to significant bias in judgment and questionable practices. Academic institutions, journals, and funding agencies have developed and enforced policies to mitigate issues related to COI, especially surrounding financial interests. After a case of editorial COI in a prominent bioethics journal, there is concern that the same level of oversight regarding COIs in the biomedical sciences may not apply to the field of bioethics. In this study, (...) we examined the availability and comprehensiveness of COI policies for authors, peer reviewers, and editors of bioethics journals. Methods: After developing a codebook, we analyzed the content of online COI policies of 63 bioethics journals, along with policy information provided by journal editors that was not publicly available. Results: Just over half of the bioethics journals had COI policies for authors (57%), and only 25% for peer reviewers and 19% for editors. There was significant variation among policies regarding definitions, the types of COIs described, the management mechanisms, and the consequences for noncompliance. Definitions and descriptions centered on financial COIs, followed by personal and professional relationships. Almost all COI policies required disclosure of interests for authors as the primary management mechanism. Very few journals outlined consequences for noncompliance with COI policies or provided additional resources. Conclusion: Compared to other studies of biomedical journals, a much lower percentage of bioethics journals have COI policies and these vary substantially in content. The bioethics publishing community needs to develop robust policies for authors, peer reviewers, and editors and these should be made publicly available to enhance academic and public trust in bioethics scholarship. (shrink)