A proposal is made concerning the introduction of the notions of cause and reason into a natural language understanding system. Its hypothesis is that one should prefer rational explanations of actions when dealing with human, or human‐like, agents, if one can find them in what one is analyzing, but that in other, nonhuman, cases one should prefer causal explanations. The reader is reminded of the existing state of the preference semantics system, and then are described the changes that would have (...) to be made to incorporate the above proposal and to find examples to test it. Finally, it is argued that there is no reason to think that a more complex taxonomy of causes (beyond the opposition of causes and reasons) is required, at least not if, as here. one seeks a procedural distinction corresponding to any taxonomic distinction among inference rules. (shrink)

This paper explores the link between rules of grammar, grammar formalisms and the architecture of the language faculty. In doing so, it provides a flexible meta-level theory of the language faculty through the postulation of general axioms that govern the interaction of different components of grammar. The idea is simply that such an abstract formulation allows us to view the structure of the language faculty independently of specific theoretical frameworks/formalisms. It turns out that the system of rules, axioms and constraints (...) of grammar cannot beexplicitlyrepresented in a general architecture of the language faculty — which circumvents the ontological mismatch of mental representations and formal/axiomatic properties of language. Rather, the system of rules, axioms, constraints of grammar isintentionallyprojected by humans, and this projection realizes/instantiates what Dascal (1992) calls ‘psychopragmatics’. Relevant implications for linguistic theory, learnability and (computational) models of language processing are also explored. (shrink)