Social robotics is a rapidly developing industry-oriented area of research, intent on making robots in social roles commonplace in the near future. This has led to rising interest in the dynamics as well as ethics of human-robot relationships, described here as a nascent relational turn. A contrast is drawn with the 1990s’ paradigm shift associated with relational-self themes in social psychology. Constructions of the human-robot relationship reproduce the “I-You-Me” dominant model of theorising about the self with biases that (as in (...) social constructionism) consistently accentuate externalist or “interactionist” standpoints as opposed to internalist or “individualistic”. Perspectives classifiable as “ecological relationalism” may compensate for limitations of interactionist-individualistic dimension. Implications for theorising subjectivity are considered. (shrink)

Simulation software used for modeling has become as ubiquitous as computers themselves. Despite growing reliance on simulation in educational and workplace settings, users encounter frustration in using simulation software programs. The authors conducted a study with 26 engineering students and interviewed them about their experience learning the simulation software Arena for optimization modeling. These students experienced frustration with the process of learning to “think” like the simulation software. Students explained their difficulty with learning the software in a way that implied (...) human dialogue with a machine and negotiation with Arena in an attempt to overcome this frustration. Rather than being gender specific, frustrations were experienced by most male and female students equally, specifically those who held a perception of difference between human and machine “thinking.” The authors contend that communication difficulty with the embedded assumptions of the software is the source of frustration rather than deficiencies of users. (shrink)

Participants in the long-running bioethical debate over human germline genetic modification (HGGM) tend to imagine future people abstractly and on the basis of conventionalized characteristics familiar from science fiction, such as intelligence, disease resistance and height. In order to distinguish these from scientifically meaningful terms like “phenotype” and “trait,” this article proposes the term “persemes” to describe the units of difference for hypothetical people. In the HGGM debate, persemes are frequently conceptualized as similar, modular entities, like building blocks to be (...) assembled into genetically modified people. They are discussed as though they each would be chosen individually without affecting other persemes and as though they existed as components within future people rather than being imposed through social context. This modular conceptual framework appears to influence bioethical approaches to HGGM by reinforcing the idea of human capacities as natural primary goods subject to distributive justice and supporting the use of objective list theories of well-being. As a result, assumptions of modularity may limit the ability of stakeholders with other perspectives to present them in the HGGM debate. This article examines the historical trends behind the modular framework for genetically modified people, its likely psychological basis, and its philosophical ramifications. (shrink)