Recently, a number of Kantians have argued that despite Kant’s own disparaging comments about same-sex intercourse and marriage, his ethical and legal philosophy lacks the resources to show that they are impermissible. I go further by arguing that his framework is in fact more open to same-sex than to different-sex marriage. Central is Kant’s claim that marriage requires equality between spouses. Kant himself thought that men and women are not equal, and some of his more insightful remarks on the issue (...) reveal that he was also aware that, as a matter of fact, women were disenfranchised by society, and suffer legal and other forms of discrimination. Kant, according to his own account, cannot approve of heterosexual marriage. Same-sex couples, by contrast, can satisfy the crucial equality condition. I conclude with a suggestion for refocus with respect to the issues at hand, calling for attention to more complex and insidious forms of inequality than deprivation of rights and full civil participation. (shrink)

This first part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage assesses whether Kant should be condemned as a sexist due to his various offensive claims about women. Being antithetical to modern-day assumptions regarding the equality of the sexes, Kant’s views seem to contradict his own egalitarian ethics. A philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments requires one to assess those in other cultures by their own ethical standards. Sexism (...) is inappropriate if it exhibits or reinforces a tendency to dominate the opposite sex. Kant’s theory of marriage, by contrast, illustrates how sexism can be egalitarian: given the natural differences between the sexes, different roles and cultural norms help to ensure that females and males are equal. Judged by the standards of his own day and in the context of his philosophical system, Kant’s sexism is not ethically inappropriate. (shrink)

This second part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage considers how the institution of marriage might evolve, if Kant’s reasons for defending monogamy are extended and applied to a future culture. After summarizing the philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments that was introduced in Part I and then explaining Kant’s portrayal of marriage as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex, I summarize Kant’s reasons for (...) rejecting polygamy and for viewing monogamy as the only ethically acceptable form of marriage. Finally, I argue that if we apply Kantian principles to the real situation of marriage in many modern cultures, and if we wish to maintain a legitimate place for marriage in the future evolution of human culture, then the future evolution of marriage laws must recognize polyfidelity (i.e., plural marriages for both men and women) as being just as legitimate as monogamy. (shrink)

Can choosing to sale one’s kidney be morally permissible? “No”, Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one’s own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant’s instruction. He thought that organ sale violates this imperative. Lectures on Ethics shows that “... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money…. If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and (...) then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrown his person away....” This paper explains Kant’s reasons against commerce in organs, drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context, a case which he himself compares to the selling of one’s body part. Can choosing to donate one’s kidney be morally permissible? If we take Kant’s views at face value, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality only if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other’s persons. In this context, however, a person has a right to her partner’s kidney should she happen to need it, which can open the path to bodily violation. Moreover, this view severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation. In this paper, I argue that a closer examination of Kant’s views on what is involved in the idea of respecting humanity could reveal that organ donation does not violate the categorical imperative. In fact, it could be said to follow from such an imperative that we actually have a duty to organ donation. (shrink)

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant 's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant 's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage (...) within his philosophy of law. (shrink)