Leibniz frequently uses the notion of expression, but it is not easy to see just how he understood that relation. This paper focuses on the particular case of the expression of God, which is prominent in the 'Discourse on Metaphysics'. The treatment of expression there suggests several questions. Which substances did Leibniz believe expressed God? Why did Leibniz believe those substances expressed God? And did he believe that all substances expressed God in the same way and for the same reasons? (...) In answering those questions the paper distinguishes two views about expression in the 'Discourse', considers Leibniz's reasons for holding that substances express their causes, and argues that Leibniz's views about emanative causation are important for understanding the unity of his apparently distinct views here. The paper concludes by looking briefly at how the 'Discourse' fits into the evolution of Leibniz's views on this issue over time. (shrink)

In the 1680s, Gottfried Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld engaged in a philosophically rich correspondence. One issue they discuss is modal metaphysics – questions concerning necessity, possibility, and essence. While Arnauld's contributions to the correspondence are considered generally astute, his contributions on this issue have not always received a warm treatment. I argue that Arnauld's criticisms of Leibniz are sophisticated and that Arnauld offers his own Cartesian account in its place. In particular, I argue that Arnauld offers an account of possibility (...) that is actualist, modal actualist and essence-based. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper makes use of the 1860 clash between T. H. Huxley and Richard Owen to examine the role of social context in scientific advance in the biological sciences. It shows how the social context of nineteenth-century England first favored the Coleridge-Owenite interpretation of the biological world and then, at mid-century and subsequently, allowed the Darwin-Huxley interpretation to win through. It emphasizes the complexity of the clash. Professional, personal, and generational agendas as well as scientific theory and fundamental philosophical (...) intuition were at stake. The history, ultimately, provides a useful instance of Schutz ‘s and Scheler ‘s concept of societal factors controlling and selecting between flows of idealfactoren. Although Huxley is conventionally regarded as the victor I conclude by suggesting that the issue is not yet closed and that profound philosophical issues remain unresolved. (shrink)

Anyone preparing to work through Catherine Wilson's important 1989 book, Leibniz's Metaphysics, would be well advised to go back for another look at Bertrand Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, for it is this book that provides the foil and the context for much that Wilson has to say. In particular, the preface to Russell's first edition stresses the very points regarding both methodology and content on which Wilson will disagree most vigorously with her predecessor.

According to the standard view of his metaphysics, Leibniz endorses idealism: the thesis that the world is made up solely of minds or monads and their perceptual and appetitive states. Recently,this view has been challenged by some scholars, who argue that Leibniz can be seen as admitting corporeal substances, that is, animals or embodied souls, into his ontology, and that, therefore, it is false to attribute a strict idealism to him. Subtler accounts suggest that Leibniz begins his philosophical career as (...) an advocate of (some form of) the modern ‘mechanical’ philosophy and ends his career as an idealist, raising the issue when and why Leibniz adopts his monadological metaphysics. This article argues that, given a constellation of metaphysical, logical, and theological views, Leibniz is committed to the ontological primacy of mind or form even in his ‘middle years’. (shrink)

This article examines the rift in Leibniz’s conception of determinism after being rebuffed by the Parisian theologian Antoine Arnauld in their correspondence of 1686. As, in addition, his study of surds infracted his confidence in the “complete concept,” Leibniz embarked on a new, dynamic doctrine of substance or “law of the series.” In the literature, this strategy has been widely understood as “tweaking” the system to allow some self-assertion of free will. But as this article will show, it amounts to (...) a revolutionary conception that culminates in the unmasking of determinism as an insupportable, indeed incoherent doctrine. As all forms of determinism are profoundly entangled with human self-perception, the Leibnizian Kehre invites us to a new engagement with human freedom and autonomy and the disentanglement from a philosophical position for which neither a metaphysical nor an empirical proof can be given. (shrink)

Resumen En el presente trabajo analizo el concepto de cuerpo en los escritos maduros de Leibniz. En el marco del debate contemporáneo acerca del estatus de la sustancia corpórea examino el entramado de las tres nociones sobre las que se construye la metafísica leibniziana de los cuerpos, a saber, la de materia prima, la de cuerpo orgánico y la de extensión. En cada caso evalúo el estatus ontológico que Leibniz les reconoce así como el papel que cumplen en su metafísica.In (...) this paper I examine the concept of body in Leibniz’s mature writings. In the context of the contemporary debate on the status of the corporeal substance, I analyze the relation between the three notions from which he builds his metaphysics of bodies, namely, the primary matter, the organic body, and the extension. For each case I evaluate their ontological status and the role they play in his metaphysics. (shrink)

Leibnizian metaphysics is traditionally held to be idealistic. It means that reality is composed of soul-like substances whereas material bodies are mere phenomena. The traditional interpretation presupposes that Leibniz’s view has not changed during the mature period (from 1683 onward). Some commentators have recently challenged this view. They claim that either Leibniz (despite inconsistency) was both a realist and an idealist (Hartz), or changed his view on the nature of substance (Garber). The aim is to defend the traditional interpretation and (...) to reply to the arguments by realist commentators. (shrink)

In this paper we study the impact of Leibniz’s critique of infinite numbers in his metaphysics of bodies. After presenting the relation that the German philosopher establishes in his youth between the notions of body, extension and infinite quantities, we analyze his thoughts on the paradoxes of the infinite numbers and we claim that his defense of the inconsistency of such numbers is an inflexion point in his conception of body and mark the beginning of his offensive against the res (...) extensa. (shrink)