The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

The gendered marketing of children’s toys is under considerable scrutiny, as reflected by numerous consumer-led campaigns and vigorous media debates. This article seeks to assist stakeholders to better understand the ethical and scientific assumptions that underlie the two opposing positions in this debate, and assess their relative strength. There is apparent consensus in the underlying ethical foundations of the debate, with all commentators seeming to endorse the values of corporate social responsibility and gender equality. However, the debate splits over three (...) critical points of empirical disagreement: whether gendered toy marketing influences children’s toy preferences or simply reflects boys’ and girls’ fundamentally different interests; whether the effects of gendered toy marketing are negative, neutral or beneficial; and whether a shift to gender-neutral marketing would be economically viable. We assess the three points of disagreement against the available evidence and shared ethical principles underlying the debate, and conclude that current defences of gendered toy marketing fail. (shrink)

Non-medical sex selection is premised on the notion that the sexes are not interchangeable. Studies of individuals who undergo sex selection for non-medical reasons, or who have a preference for a son or daughter, show that they assume their child will conform to the stereotypical roles and norms associated with their sex. However, the evidence currently available has not succeeded in showing that the gender traits and inclinations sought are caused by a “male brain” or a “female brain”. Therefore, as (...) far as we know, there is no biological reason why parents cannot have the kind of parenting experience they seek with a child of any sex. Yet gender essentialism, a set of unfounded assumptions about the sexes which pervade society and underpin sexism, prevents parents from realising this freedom. In other words, unfounded assumptions about gender constrain not only a child’s autonomy, but also the parent’s. To date, reproductive autonomy in relation to sex selection has predominantly been regarded merely as the freedom to choose the sex of one’s child. This paper points to at least two interpretations of reproductive autonomy and argues that sex selection, by being premised on gender essentialism and/or the social pressure on parents to ensure their children conform to gender norms, undermines reproductive autonomy on both accounts. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask feminist philosophers and science studies scholars to consider the goals of developing critical analyses of evolutionary psychology. These goals can include development of scholarship in feminist philosophy and science studies, mediation of the uptake of evolutionary psychology by other academic and lay communities, and improvement of the practices and products of evolutionary psychology itself. I evaluate ways that some practices of feminist philosophy and science studies facilitate or hinder meeting these goals, and consider the merits (...) of critical engagement with some of the scientists themselves. Finally, I describe a community of feminist evolutionary psychologists with whom it might be both fruitful and interesting to engage, and identify ways that these interactions may benefit the science and the study of the science. (shrink)

Faced with the charge of value-ladenness in their theories, researchers in evolutionary psychology (EP) argue that their science is entirely free of values; their hypotheses only concern scientific facts, without any socio-cultural value judgments. Lynn Hankinson Nelson, a renowned feminist scholar of science, denies this. In her book and papers, Nelson finds that their hypotheses do contain evaluative components. One such example is the fear of snakes. While this fear was adaptive to the environment in the past, evolutionary psychologists argue (...) that this trait is now “maladaptive” because city-dwellers would rarely encounter snakes in their environment. However, Nelson argues that labeling this trait “maladaptive” implies that this fear is irrational since this claim cannot be understood otherwise. This paper argues that this and other arguments made by Nelson for demonstrating the value-ladenness in EP’s hypotheses have serious flaws. For instance, we argue that investigating the psychological mechanisms behind the fear and their developmental and energy costs would allow for proper interpretation of evolutionary psychologists’ claims for the maladaptive fear of snakes without any normative implication. We also maintain that some of her arguments fail to demonstrate their connection to the point at the center of the debates between EP and feminism. While Nelson may be right in stating that EP’s hypotheses have evaluative components, she does not prove their strong political or normative implications, which is central to the debate over EP. (shrink)

Edward Dinker Cope (1840-1897) był jednym z najbardziej wpływowych przyrodników XIX wieku, który doprowadził do rozwoju amerykańskiej paleontologii oraz popularyzacji teorii ewolucji Lamarcka. Teorię tę rozwinął pod postacią autorskiej koncepcji psycholamarkizmu. Jednym z pomijanych wątków jego biografii są jego poglądy filozoficzne. Zdaniem Cope’a teologia naturalna powinna zostać zreformowana przez wprowadzenie do niej nowych założeń filozoficznych, zgodnych z formującą się nauką ewolucjonizmu. Cope proponował stworzenie nowej „teologii”, która miała się opierać na jego koncepcji ewolucji kierowanej świadomością, jak również doborem naturalnym. W (...) artykule przeanalizowano filozoficzne propozycje Cope’a oraz ukazano, w jaki sposób zreinterpretował mechanizm selekcji, wpisując go w swoją teleologiczną wizję procesu ewolucyjnego. Zdaniem Cope’a człowiek, posiadając wolną wolę, jest w stanie kierować swoją ewolucją, lecz nie ma gwarancji tego, że będzie w stanie przetrwać. Teza ta miała charakter teologiczny w dziełach Cope’a, który w nieprzystosowaniu widział odpowiednik grzechu, a ten z kolei eliminowany był przez dobór naturalny. W ten sposób akceptacja Boga stawała się jedyną drogą gwarantującą przetrwanie. Jednak ta konkluzja doprowadziła Cope’a do racjonalizacji rasizmu, gdyż widział on w wyzysku innych ras skutki ich ewolucyjnej degeneracji. Poglądy Cope’a odzwierciedlają współczesne problemy, jakie można zauważyć w naukach społecznych, jeśli odwołują się do mechanizmu doboru naturalnego. --------------- Zgłoszono: 29/08/2021. Zrecenzowano: 11/10/2021. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 25/10/2021. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...) the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

In light of the advancements in cognitive science and the evolutionary psychology of religion in the past two decades, scientists and philosophers have begun to reflect on the theological and atheological implications of naturalistic—and in particular, evolutionary—explanations of religious belief and behaviour. However, philosophical naiveté is often evinced by scientists and scientific naiveté by philosophers. The aim of this article is to draw from these recent contributions, point out some common pitfalls and important insights, and suggest a way forward. This (...) proposal avoids the genetic fallacy as well as misunderstandings of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religious belief. In the end, it may well be that the cognitive science of religion is atheologically and theologically ambiguous; traditional philosophers of religion on both sides of the debate still have work to do. (shrink)

Ethical questions have traditionally been approached through conceptual analysis. Inspired by the rapid advance of modern brain imaging techniques, however, some ethical questions appear in a new light. For example, hotly debated trolley dilemmas have recently been studied by psychologists and neuroscientists alike, arguing that their findings can support or debunk moral intuitions that underlie those dilemmas. Resulting from the wedding of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics has emerged as a novel interdisciplinary field that aims at drawing conclusive relationships between neuroscientific (...) observations and normative ethics. A major goal of neuroethics is to derive normative ethical conclusions from the investigation of neural and psychological mechanisms underlying ethical theories, as well as moral judgments and intuitions. The focus of this article is to shed light on the structure and functioning of neuroethical arguments of this sort, and to reveal particular methodological challenges that lie concealed therein. We discuss the methodological problem of how one can—or, as the case may be, cannot—validly infer normative conclusions from neuroscientific observations. Moreover, we raise the issue of how preexisting normative ethical convictions threaten to invalidate the interpretation of neuroscientific data, and thus arrive at question-begging conclusions. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that current neuroethics rightly presumes that moral considerations about actual human lives demand empirically substantiated answers. Therefore, in conclusion, we offer some preliminary reflections on how the discussed methodological challenges can be met. (shrink)

Human behavioral ecology (HBE) began as an attempt to explain human economic, reproductive, and social behavior using neodarwinian theory in concert with theory from ecology and economics, and ethnographic methods. HBE has addressed subsistence decision-making, cooperation, life history trade-offs, parental investment, mate choice, and marriage strategies among hunter-gatherers, herders, peasants, and wage earners in rural and urban settings throughout the world. Despite our rich insights into human behavior, HBE has very rarely been used as a tool to help the people (...) with whom we work. This article introduces a special issue of Human Nature which explores the application of HBE to significant world issues through the design and critique of public policy and international development projects. The articles by Tucker, Shenk, Leonetti et al., and Neil were presented at the 104th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in Washington, D.C., in December 2005, in the first organized session of the nascent Evolutionary Anthropology Section (EAS). We conclude this introduction by summarizing some theoretical challenges to applying HBE, and ways in which evolutionary anthropologists can contribute to solving tough world issues. (shrink)