Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

Plato gives us two model philosophical figures, apparently in contrast with each other—one is the otherworldly philosopher who sees truth and reality outside the cave and has the knowledge to rule authoritatively within it; the other is the demotic figure of Socrates, who insists that he does not know but only asks questions. I consider Plato’s contrasting idioms of seeing and asking or talking, and argue that the rich account of perception that is represented in the Republic requires both idioms, (...) and both models, to explain the development of epistemic virtue. Furthermore, the conditions he places on the giving and taking of reasons show how Plato takes intellectual virtue to be inseparable from moral virtue. That integrated picture of virtue may—however disposed we may be towards the role of virtue in either ethics or epistemology—have something to say to us about how philosophy might best be carried on. (shrink)

This chapter sketches four forms of realism ascribed to four great historical figures that provide an important set of determinate versions of moral realism. Plato provides a picture according to which moral facts exist in a non-concrete realm of abstract universal properties. Aristotle provides a picture according to which moral facts exist as concrete facts in the world. Hume provides a picture according to which moral facts have their basis in universal human sentiments. Kant provides a picture according to which (...) moral facts are simply truths of universal reason. It is argued that the revolution in our understanding of metaphysical explanations that occurred between Aristotle and Hume has important consequences for realist views. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the relation between Aristotle’s ethics and the crafts (or technai). My thesis is that Aristotle’s argument is at key points shaped by models proper to the crafts, this shaping being deeper than is generally acknowledged, and philosophically more problematic. Despite this, I conclude that the arguments I examine can, if revised, be upheld. The plan of the dissertation is as follows – Preface: The relation of my study to the extant secondary literature; Introduction: The (...) pre-Platonic concept of technē, as evidenced in Greek philosophical and literary sources, in particular the early Hippocratic corpus; Chapter one: The Platonic concept of technē, followed by an investigation of whether Plato affirms a virtue-technē in the Protagoras and Republic; Chapter two: Aristotle’s concept of technē, followed by scrutiny of his arguments in NE VI.5 against a virtue-technē, and of his analyses of slavery and deliberation; Chapter three: An exposition of Aristotle’s function argument, followed by a dominantist interpretation of it, and an explanation of dominantism as in part a technē-influenced doctrine; Chapter four: An examination of Aristotle’s ethical mean and its problems, with a diagnosis of these in terms of influence by the Philebus, and by paradigms derived from the crafts; Chapter five: Argument that Aristotle’s theory of habituation suffers from two significant opacities, these being a function of influence both by the Republic, and by models of craft-learning; Conclusion: Response to key objection; Aristotle’s ethics revised, defended. (shrink)

This thesis inquires into our ‘human nature’ through an interdisciplinary approach that considers some of the radical changes in intellectual thought at those key points in Western culture in which this concept has been centrally deployed. The broad historical sweep that this study covers finds the preoccupation with defining who we are and what we are capable of inextricably linked with the focus, at most of the pivotal moments examined, on a dominant impulse to conceive human beings as moral creatures.

An international event established by UNESCO in 2002 • Observed annually on the third Thursday of November, in order – to honor philosophical reflection around the world – to share thoughts, and to openly explore and discuss ideas and inspire public debate or discussion about social challenges • Objective: to make philosophy accessible and create opportunities for rational reflection, discussion and to foster independent and critical thought.

20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Platon’un Devlet’te ortaya koyduğu vatandaşlık ve yönetim teorisi totaliter, ırkçı ve eşitlikçilik karşıtı olmakla suçlanmıştır. Özellikle ulus ve yurttaş kimliği yaratmak için yönetici elitler tarafından kurgulanması öngörülen asil yalan hikayesinin vatandaşları doğuştan gelen politik ve ekonomik bir hiyerarşiye inandırmak için bir propaganda aracı gibi kullanılması haklı olarak yoğun eleştirilere maruz kalmıştır. Platon’u yukarıdaki suçlamalar karşısında tamamen aklamayacak olsa bile, asil yalanın epistemik statüsü ve ikna etme gücü hakkında yapılacak dilsel ve mantıksal analizler bize Platon’un felsefi amacına (...) dair kapsamlı bir resim sunabilir. Bu bağlamda, (i) asil yalanın filozof-yönetici olmak için eğitilecekleri Kallipolis’in ve vatandaşların iyiliği için çalışmaya yönlendirmek için kurgulanmış olduğu; (ii) Platon’un bu yalanla ne kendini tamamıyla gerçekleştirmiş filozof-yöneticilerin ne de halkın geri kalanının Kallipolis’in yönetim biçiminin iyiliği ve yararı konusunda ikna olmasını beklemediği iddia edilecektir. Bu hikâye hem Devlet’i okuyacak sıradan halkın Platon’un idealini anlaması için hem de eğer bir gün Kallipolis kurulacaksa rasyonel argümanları anlayamayacak vatandaşları ikna etmek için kullanılabilir. Sonuç olarak, bu makale Platon’un asil yalanın ideal devletinin ne kuruluşu ne de istikrarlı bir şekilde sürdürülmesi için güvence sağlayamayacağının farkında olduğunu, asil yalanın politik ideali için ne zorunlu ne de gerekli olduğunu göstermeyi hedeflemektedir. (shrink)