This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. (...) I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge‐First view of justification that avoids scepticism by rejecting the entailment of justification by knowledge. This combination turns out to have unpalatable consequences. Nonetheless, the process of reaching that conclusion teaches lessons both to the evidentialist (regarding what evidence could be) and to the knowledge‐firster (regarding what justification is). (shrink)

Constructivism is frequently met with objections, criticism and often equated with nihilism or relativism. Sometimes even blamed for what some would randomly picture as unwanted side effects of radicalism or of a progressivist era: such misconceptions are not only due to an imprecise grasp of the premises shared by the constructivist family of systems. The structure of media, political systems, and economic models, still up today impel societal understandings of knowledge on neo-positivistic grounds. The first part of this essay outlines (...) such pressures while sketching how language and worldviews play critical roles in our knowledge construction. Focusing on recent mediatic events, this work advances displaying some essential limits regarding the construction of human knowledge. Though unavoidable, some of the distinguishing aspects regarding the nature of our narratives are then critically reviewed. Later, it is shown how a special kind of self-denial that certain sub-stories implicitly hold about their own narrative nature leaves us with clashing worldviews that eventually collide onto crisis. Finally, it’ll be argued that it’s precisely in this scenario where a constructivist depiction of social discourses may move us away from any adolescent intent of elucidating absolutes within mere heuristics, to the pragmatic need of arriving on satisfactory agreements between parties (DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2022). (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti‐skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti‐skeptical strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses. According to the account developed here, this claim is (...) misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that response. (shrink)