The thesis of this paper is that truth in politics is intersubjectively constituted within a set of relationships irreducible to the oppositions of truth and falsehood or veracity and lying. First, I examine the link between factual truth and politics, and argue that this sort of truth pervades our experience and tends to become background knowledge. Second, I propose a reading of Plato’s Apology according to which the truth in politics is grounded on an intersubjective normative and epistemological horizon, which (...) is vicariously communicated as gesture. Third, in relation to Plato’s Republic and Gorgias, I inquire about the semantic connections between fiction and lie and assert that the expression of the truth in politics requires a poetic endeavor, which blurs the lines separating veracity and lying. Finally, based on Agamben’s interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Minor, I conclude that the institution of the truth in politics requires diverse expressive and interpretive capacities. (shrink)

"Transparency" is the constant refrain of democratic politics, a promised aid to accountability and integrity in public life. Secrecy is stigmatized as a work of corruption, tolerable by a compromise of democratic principles. My dissertation challenges both ideas. It argues that secrecy and transparency are best understood as complementary, not contradictory, practices. And it develops a normative account of liberal democratic politics in which duties of transparency coexist with permissions to act behind closed doors. The project begins with some history. (...) I show that the language of transparency gained currency only in the last quarter century, and explain how its proximate sources promote three dubious assumptions—that disclosure should in principle be maximized, that it prevents misrule more or less automatically, and that its value is either instrumental, or rooted in a reductive notion of democracy as the rule of popular opinion. Against these assumptions, I sketch an alternative account of liberal democracy centered on the logics of representation, liberty, and equality. These three "logics of self-government" give rise to duties of transparency binding on public and private actors alike. Such obligations have bite, I argue, but they are not all-encompassing. Indeed, the same ideals of representation, liberty, and equality license concealment in a range of important contexts, including deliberation and dissent. Having made this case, I go on to explain how secrecy and transparency can form a "democratic dyad," deepening rather than undermining the project of self-rule. Lastly, I address the limits of conventional transparency practices. Taken alone, disclosure is subject to a range of pitfalls, often failing to produce the results promised in transparency’s name. While my non-instrumental case for openness is not destabilized by this analysis, it does suggest that mandating disclosure is rarely enough. I therefore propose a series of adversarial practices to facilitate the checking of unjustifiable secrecy, and highlight the critical role of interpretation in efforts to make power intelligible. In the end, my dissertation offers a novel defense of secrecy and transparency that highlights rather than minimizes the hard work of political engagement. (shrink)

Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can (...) be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics. (shrink)

En este artículo defiendo la idea de que existen diferencias relevantes entre la mentira común y la mentira política. Mi propósito es mostrar que las dificultades con la mentira política no tienen que ver solamente con cuestiones metafísicas o conceptuales acerca de la delimitación del ámbito de la política o del concepto de lo político, ni con la solidez de las excusas y justificaciones que se ofrecen en favor de los políticos mentirosos. Sostengo que la mentira política es una forma (...) especial de mentira debido, primero, a la peculiaridad del uso del lenguaje en política y, segundo, a la función de las mentiras políticas, a saber, socavar diversas clases de condiciones epistémicas necesarias para la discusión imparcial de los desacuerdos sociales. En este trabajo dejo sin responder la pregunta de cuál sea la mejor forma de articular aquellas condiciones epistémicas en la discusión política democrática. (shrink)

Political institutions can be transparent or secret. If they are transparent, then we have access to information about how agents act within them. If they are secret, then we do not have access to this information. The presence and extent of transparency has tremendous impact on how political institutions function. The purpose of this article is to offer a brief overview of what political philosophers have thus far had to say about transparency as it pertains to political institutions. In doing (...) so, I hope to connect philosophical questions about transparency to relevant social scientific work and to highlight areas where more work needs to be done. (shrink)

This article aims to systematize different alternatives for the conceptualization of lying, in order to clarify the meaning of contemporary post-truth. Given the limitations of a historical reconstruction of the meanings of lying devised by the philosophical tradition, and because conceptual analysis risks of fetishizing the lying assertion, we aim to enrich the conceptualization of lying through the lexicographical description of the prototypical sense and the variants of our idiomatic vocabulary for lying. By distinguishing the formal conditions of telling a (...) lie and the situational nuances of the realization of lying, one can recognize a new regime of lies in contemporary post-truth. (shrink)