The American Society for Bioethics and the Humanities (ASBH) issued its Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation just as it is becoming ever clearer that secular ethics is intractably plural and without foundations in any reality that is not a social–historical construction (ASBH Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation , 2nd edn. American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Glenview, IL, 2011 ). Core Competencies fails to recognize that the ethics of health care ethics consultants is not ethics in (...) the usual sense of a morally canonical ethics. Its ethics is the ethics established at law and in enforceable health care public policy in a particular jurisdiction. Its normativity is a legal normativity, so that the wrongness of violating this ethics is simply the legal penalties involved and the likelihood of their being imposed. That the ethics of ethics consultation is that ethics legally established accounts for the circumstance that the major role of hospital ethics consultants is as quasi-lawyers giving legal advice, aiding in risk management, and engaging in mediation. It also indicates why this collage of roles has succeeded so well. This article shows how moral philosophy as it was reborn in the 13th century West led to the ethics of modernity and then finally to the ethics of hospital ethics consultation. It provides a brief history of the emergence of an ethics that is after morality. Against this background, the significance of Core Competencies must be critically reconsidered. (shrink)

Several inquires about healthcare over the past several decades have shown that the evolution of healthcare practices exhibit their own microcosm of local and political influences. Likewise, other studies have shown clearly the ways in which both external and internal institutional factors establish the sectors within which healthcare is delivered. Although restrictions have always been present in some form, it seems obvious that whatever the precise form of healthcare delivery that results from current changes in its organization, there are going (...) to be broader restrictions not only on the choices that providers will be able to make about individual patients' care and needs, but also regarding the character of their clinical judgments. Indeed, there are already reports of instances where physicians' contracts with managed care organizations forbid them to disclose the existence of services not covered by a plan. (shrink)

Casuistic methods of reasoning in medical ethics have been criticized by a number of authors. At least five main objections to casuistry have been put forward: (1) it requires a uniformity of views that is not present in contemporary pluralistic society; (2) it cannot achieve consensus on controversial issues; (3) it is unable to examine critically intuitions about cases; (4) it yields different conclusions about cases when alternative paradigms are chosen; and (5) it cannot articulate the grounds of its conclusions. (...) Two main versions of casuistry have been put forward, and the responses to these objections depend in part on which version one is defending. Jonsen has advocated a version modeled on the approach to casuistry used by moral theologians in the 15th and 16th century, involving comparison of the case at hand with a single paradigm and a lineup of cases. The present author has advocated another version, drawn from experience with cases in clinical ethics, which involves comparing the case at hand with two or more paradigms. Four of the five objections are unsuccessful when directed against Jonsen'sapproach, and all of them are unsuccessful when directed against the approach involving comparison with two or more paradigms. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the application questions of a case study method known as casuistry. In its long tradition, it focuses on an influential variant of the early modern period and reconstructs its functionality. In the course of reading recent receptions, it is noted that some studies speak of a “casuistic revival” in moral case deliberation in health care. As a result of this revival, casuistry has been modified in such a way that it guides case discussions in practice (...) with the help of a tripartite methodology. However, as it turns out, casuistry, a case comparison method of ethical judgement based on reasoning logic, is less suitable for moral case deliberations in direct patient care. This stems from the fact that casuistry is a detailed procedure of ethical learning beneficial to institutionalized ethics committees or similar forms of ethics consultation in health care. (shrink)

Several inquires about healthcare over the past several decades have shown that the evolution of healthcare practices exhibit their own microcosm of local and political influences. Likewise, other studies have shown clearly the ways in which both external and internal institutional factors establish the sectors within which healthcare is delivered. Although restrictions have always been present in some form, it seems obvious that whatever the precise form of healthcare delivery that results from current changes in its organization, there are going (...) to be broader restrictions not only on the choices that providers will be able to make about individual patients' care and needs, but also regarding the character of their clinical judgments. Indeed, there are already reports of instances where physicians' contracts with managed care organizations forbid them to disclose the existence of services not covered by a plan. (shrink)

Contemporary liberal democracies contain multiple cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions. Within these societies, different interpretive communities provide divergent models for understanding health, illness, and moral obligations. Bioethicists commonly draw upon models of moral reasoning that presume the existence of shared moral intuitions. Principlist bioethics, case-based models of moral deliberation, intuitionist frameworks, and cost-benefit analyses all emphasise the uniformity of moral reasoning. However, religious and cultural differences challenge assumptions about common modes of moral deliberation. Too often, bioethicists minimize or ignore the (...) existence of multiple traditions of moral inquiry. Careful consideration of the presence of multiple horizons for moral deliberation generates challenging questions about the capacity of bioethicists to effectively resolve complex cases and social policy disputes. (shrink)

For many individuals, religious traditions provide important resources for moral deliberation. While contemporary philosophical approaches in bioethics draw upon secular presumptions, religion continues to play an important role in both personal moral reasoning and public debate. In this analysis, I consider the connections between religious traditions and understandings of morality, medicine, illness, suffering, and the body. The discussion is not intended to provide a theological analysis within the intellectual constraints of a particular religious tradition. Rather, I offer an interpretive analysis (...) of how religious norms often play a role in shaping understandings of morality. While many late 19th and early 20th century social scientists predicted the demise of religion, religious traditions continue to play important roles in the lives of many individuals. Whether bioethicists are sympathetic or skeptical toward the normative claims of particular religious traditions, it is important that bioethicists have an understanding of how religious models of morality, illness, and healing influence deliberations within the health care arena. (shrink)