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  1. Anti-Luminosity and Anti-Realism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-24.
    This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different forms of metaethical anti-realism (namely, error theorists, subjectivists, relativists, contextualists, expressivists, response dependence theorists, and constructivists) could (...)
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  • Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether (...)
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  • Truth is One.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophia Scientiae 13 (1):1-12.
    This paper examines the “pluralist” conception of truth defended by Crispin Wright, and stresses its difficulties and its dangerous flirtation with relativsm. A solution to these difficulties, which Wright himself contemplates, consists in embracing a functionalist theory of truth, according to which truth is a kind of formal property “realised” differently in various domains. But this view, it is argued, does not get rid of the difficulties of pluralism. It is then argued that we have to accept that truth is (...)
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  • Recent work on alethic pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
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