Este estudo ocupa-se com o debate entre Kant e Schiller a respeito do papel das inclinações e do dever na moralidade. Baseando-se em um epigrama de Schiller muitos críticos da ética de Kant afirmaram que Kant não oferece nenhum lugar aos sentimentos na ética. Entretanto, esse cenário tem mudado nos últimos anos com vários membros da Kant-Forschung ressaltando o papel que Kant confere a virtude e aos sentimentos em suas obras tardias e que a obra Sobre graça e dignidade seria (...) aquela em que se poderia melhor identificar a posição de Schiller em relação à ética de Kant. Por conseguinte, esse estudo busca mostrar como dever e inclinação ocupa um papel importante nas concepções éticas de Schiller e Kant. Além disso, Schiller suscita algumas críticas à ética de Kant e esse estudo busca esboçar algumas respostas de Kant a essas objeções em obras como A metafísica dos costumes, Vorarbeiten zur Religion e Vorlesungen zur Moralphilosophie. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct Schiller's theory of virtue from his essay “On grace and dignity” and discuss how it fits into Kant's moral philosophy. According to Schiller, a virtuous person – a beautiful soul – is characterised by harmony between reason and sensibility. I show that despite some misleading textual clues and interpretations based on them, Schiller does not regard the harmony between reason and sensibility as an equal partnership. On the contrary, just like Kant, Schiller fully recognises the (...) priority of reason. The difference between their positions is more subtle. Whereas Kant holds that sensibility must be overtly subordinated to reason, Schiller believes that there should be a semblance of an equal partnership between reason and sensibility, provided that the latter is sufficiently ennobled. (shrink)

This article outlines arguments in Schiller's major philosophical works, including his writings on tragedy, "Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man" and "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry.".

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 795-810, December 2021.

This paper examines the iconic conception of aesthetic education in the work of Friedrich Schiller, with the aim of elucidating Schiller’s unique innovation of this notion in understanding i) the relationship between aesthetic and ethical value and ii) the transformative possibilities within a collective, social dimension of aesthetic experience. The paper provides an overview of the Kantian origins of Schiller’s aesthetic programme (Section 1). It then considers Schiller’s critique of the perceived failings of the Kantian and Enlightenment republican models of (...) ethical value and political emancipation (Section 2) before turning to his positive alternative aesthetic programme (Section 3). The paper concludes (Section 4) with some evaluation and reflection on Schiller’s original contributions. (shrink)