In this paper I argue that inconsistencies in scientific theories may arise from the type of causality relation they—tacitly or explicitly—embody. All these seemingly different causality relations can be subsumed under a general strategy developed to defeat the paradoxes which inevitably occur in our experience of the real. With respect to this, scientific theories are just a subclass of the larger class of metaphysical theories, construed as theories that attempt to explain a (part of) the world consistently. All metaphysical theories (...) share a common structural backbone specificially designed to defeat paradoxes, their often wildly diverging ontological claims notwithstanding. This common structure shapes the procedures which govern the invention of ideas in the context of such theories, by codifying some onto-logical a priori assumptions regarding the consistency of reality into its bare conceptual framework. Causality plays a key rôle here, because it implies conservation of identity, itself a far from simple notion. It imposes strong demands on the universalising power of the theories concerned. These demands are often met by the introduction of a metalevel which encompasses the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lawful behaviour’. In classical mechanics, the division between universal and particular leaves its traces in the separate treatment of cinematics and dynamics. The fundamental backbone’s specific gestalt thus functions as a theory’s individual signature and paves the way to a comparative historical approach towards their study. An important part of my paper therefore explores the strong connections between paradoxes as they appear and are dealt with in ancient philosophy and their re-appearance in early modern natural philosophy and science. This analysis is applied to the mechanical theories of Newton and Leibniz, with some surprising results. (shrink)

En este artículo examinamos los aspectos más relevantes de la concepción del espacio de Leibniz. A través de un enfoque genético, nuestro propósito es mostrar que, en su desarrollo evolutivo, dicha concepción sufre dos transiciones destacables, las que separan y distinguen tres versiones teóricas. En su juventud, Leibniz defiende una concepción substancialista del espacio. Sin embargo, debido a la adopción del nominalismo, dicha concepción sufre un primer giro que decanta en un monismo substancialoide, el que se consolida en el período (...) medio de la filosofía de Leibniz. Ya en el período tardío, Leibniz reformula, en una segunda transición, su concepción del espacio, la que adopta la forma definitiva de -lo que llamamos- un relacionismo substancialoide. (shrink)

Resumen En la siguiente discusión presento algunas objeciones al artículo de Federico Raffo Quintana “La noción de ‘espacio’ en los escritos juveniles de Leibniz”.1 Contra la interpretación de Raffo, quien considera que la concepción del espacio como lugar universal de las cosas es una idea que Leibniz abandona de manera muy temprana -según el autor en 1671-, intento mostrar que esta concepción trasciende sin duda el periodo de los escritos juveniles de Leibniz y que ciertas confusiones conceptuales en la lectura (...) de Raffo hacen que, en vez de ver una armónica continuidad en la teoría del espacio de Leibniz, vea en ella una ruptura en su evolución histórica, a la que, además, asocia algunas dicotomías discutibles o espurias.In this paper I introduce objections to Federico Raffo Quintana’s paper “The Notion of ‘Space’ in the Young Leibniz Writings”. Against Raffo, who considers that the Leibnizian conception of space as the universal place of things is an idea that Leibniz early abandons -Raffo says in 1671-, I will try to show that such a conception goes beyond the Leibniz’s young writings and that it is because of some conceptual confusions in Raffo’s survey that he, instead of seeing a harmonic continuity in Leibniz’s theory of space, sees a rupture in its historical evolution, associating to it some disputable or spurious dichotomies. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the main metaphysical and religious ideas of the eighteenth-century political theorist and chemist Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) with those of his correspondent Ruder Boscovic (1711–1787), astronomer, poet, mathematician, diplomat and Jesuit priest. It points out the theological differences between the two thinkers resulting from the divergent ontological and metaphysical implications of the theory of point atomism that they shared. This theory they placed in a wider context, considering both its limits and its value as a contribution (...) to ongoing speculations concerning the nature of space and time, theological conundrums such as free will and the mind-body problem. Where they differed, however, was that Priestley, a chemist rather than a mathematician, used point atomism mainly to support his campaign to further materialism and discredit Christianity. Boscovic, on the other hand, carefully distinguished the truths of faith and reason and was therefore indignant at Priestley's misuse of his speculations. Boscovic's protest was probably motivated in part by the materialism of atheists such as the Baron d’Holbach (1723–1789). Priestley was no atheist, however. Interestingly, François Arouet de Voltaire (1698–1778), unaware of the works of either Boscovic or Priestley, devised a theistic materialism in his last years that in many respects resembled Priestley's. I begin with brief biographies of the two thinkers, and outline their intermittent relationship. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of the relationship between extended Leibnizian bodies and unextended Leibnizian monads, an account that shows why Leibniz was right to see intimate, explanatory connections between his studies in physics and his mature metaphysics. The first section sets the stage by introducing a case study from Leibniz's technical work on the strength of extended, rigid beams. The second section draws on that case study to introduce a model for understanding Leibniz's views on the relationship between derivative (...) and primitive forces. The third section draws on Leibniz's understanding of the relationship between derivative and primitive forces in order to shed light, in turn, on his understanding of the relationship between extended, material bodies and unextended, immaterial monads. The fourth section responds to a likely objection by arguing that Leibniz's monads may, in a perfectly reasonable sense, be spatially located. (shrink)

The `problem of time' is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representation of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization of the theory. The purpose of this short chapter is to provide an accessible introduction to the problem.