In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

The authors of 200 arguments for questions posed 19 types of questions, justified them in 62 different ways, offered a justification of the question for 50 different types of purposes, and posed the question for 49 different types of purposes. Further consolidation of the categories used in the analysis is desirable and possible. Of the six most commonly posed types of questions, only three (yes-no questions, select questions, and either-or questions) are at first glance capable of formal representation in an (...) erotetic language of the sort described by Wiśniewski (1995, 1996, 2013), but all six (including also requests to explain, identify and find a means) can be represented formally using the interrogative operators devised by Kubiński (1980). As for the types of justification, four passages argued against posing a question by denying one of its presuppositions, a strategy that implies that a question without a true answer is not worth posing. Only 20 passages, however, argued for a question by asserting a presupposition – typically in cases where their addressees might think that the premissed presupposition is false. Close analysis of five passages randomly selected from the 200 turned up four distinct conditions assumed to be necessary for a question to be worth posing: absence of a false presupposition, a way of working out a correct answer, an unbiased answerer, and a need to answer the question. The first three of these conditions can generally be presumed to be satisfied, and would need to be mentioned in justifying a question only if there was a suspicion that they were not. The fourth condition, a need to answer the question, typically does need to be established, and was the genus of the types of justification identified in half of the passages arguing for a non-rhetorical question. The dominant purpose for justifying a question, found in 111 of the passages, was to establish a need to answer the question; given that justifying a question typically amounts to establishing a need to answer it, this purpose is internal to the practice. The most common generic purposes for posing the question for which an author argued were to provoke thought, to introduce subsequent discussion of the question, to indirectly claim something (in the case of rhetorical questions), to issue a challenge, and to seek enlightenment. (shrink)

By and large, Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL, for short) is an approach to the logic of questions which puts in the centre of attention inferential aspects of questioning. IEL is not an enterprise of the last few years only. The idea originates from the late 1980s. It evolved through time. Initially, the stress was put on the phenomenon of question raising. This changed gradually, as some forms of reasoning that involve questions have appeared to be analyzable by means of the (...) conceptual apparatus developed. In this essay I present the basics of IEL and comment on them. Most, though not all, of the ideas discussed here have been scattered across my earlier publications. The invitation from the organizers of the Asking and Answering workshop (Greifswald, September 2020) resulted in an attempt of presenting the themes of IEL in a concise but, as I hope, also comprehensible way. (shrink)

Herein, I consider arguments resting on an appeal to a non-existent authority as a species of argument from authority, and ultimately show them to be reliant on arguments from analogy in their inferential force. Three sub-types of argument are discussed: from authorities as yet unborn, no longer living, or incapable of ever doing so. In each case it is shown that an element of arguing from analogy is required since there can be no direct evidence of any assertions of the (...) source. In conclusion, it is suggested that such steps of analogy are employed frequently in traditional arguments from authority. (shrink)

Prezentujemy dwa formalne narzędzia służące do modelowania rozumowań, za pomocą których rozwiązywane są szczególnego rodzaju problemy abdukcyjne. Pierwszy model, osadzony w formalizmie logiki pytań, bazuje na pojęciu słabej implikacji erotetycznej. Drugi model wykorzystuje relacje zawężania i odsiewania definiowane za po-mocą logiki pytań, semantyki sytuacyjnej i pojęcia relewancjiwątku. Na przykładzie analizy rozgrywek w grę Takie Życie pokazujemy, że oba modele adekwatnie charakteryzują dane empiryczne.

This paper introduces the inquisitive extension of R, denoted as InqR, which is a relevant logic of questions based on the logic R as the background logic of declaratives. A semantics for InqR is developed, and it is shown that this semantics is, in a precisely defined sense, dual to Routley-Meyer semantics for R. Moreover, InqR is axiomatized and completeness of the axiomatic system is established. The philosophical interpretation of the duality between Routley-Meyer semantics and the semantics for InqR is (...) also discussed. (shrink)

The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) reasons, for deductive arguments, e.g., semantic tableaux are suggested. (shrink)

I consider two cognitive phenomena: inquiring and justifying, as complementary processes running in opposite directions. I explain on an example that the former process is driven by questions and the latter is a codification of the results of the first one. Traditionally, proof theory focuses on the latter process, and thus describes the former, at best, as an example of a backward proof search. I argue that this is not the best way to analyze cognitive processes driven by questions, and (...) that proof-theoretical analysis of questions can bring mutual benefits for both proof theory and erotetic logic. In the second part of my paper (sect. 6.3) I introduce the structural rules of weakening and contraction. Results concerning their admissibility are discussed. I also sketch an erotetic interpretation of the rule of weakening as reducing information noise, and that of contraction as securing information. (shrink)

It’s commonly thought that, in conversation, speakers accept and reject propositions that have been asserted by others. Do speakers accept and reject questions as well? Intuitively, it seems that they do. But what does it mean to accept or reject a question? What is the relationship between these acts and those of asking and answering questions? Are there clear and distinct classes of reasons that speakers have for acceptance and rejection of questions? This chapter seeks to address these issues. Beyond (...) their intrinsic interest to those working on the nature of questions, solutions to these problems may aid the extension of inferentialist approaches to logic and language. Inferentialists who think that inferences should be conceived in terms of the norms we are subject to in virtue of both the sentences we accept or assert as well as those we reject or deny are known as bilateralists. A coherent account of accepting and rejecting questions raises the prospects for a bilateralism that interprets question-involving or erotetic inferences according to these additional primitives. While a full-blown bilateralism for erotetic inferences and ultimately for question-forming operators themselves far exceeds this chapter’s scope, the work presented here does sketch the first steps in that direction. (shrink)

This paper proposes two formal models for understanding real-life dialogues, aimed at capturing argumentative structures performatively enacted during conversations. In the course of the investigation, two types of discourse with a high degree of well-structured argumentation were chosen: moral debate and financial communication. The research project found itself confronted by a need to analyse, structure and formally describe large volumes of textual data, where this called for the application of computational tools. It is expected that the results of the proposed (...) research will make a contribution to formal systems modelling and the evaluation of communication from the point of view of argument soundness. (shrink)

This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in (...) the pragmatists’ fallibilistic theories of inquiry and truth, in their pluralistic metaphysics, and in their views on cultural pluralism. While there are some potential sticking points between pragmatism and perspectivism, particularly around the visual metaphor of perspective, these philosophical approaches nonetheless have much to learn from each other. Perspectivism is in danger of falling between the horns of pernicious relativism and a platitudinous view of the limits of human perception and cognition. The pragmatists accounts of truth and reality open the possibility of a more thoroughgoing perspectivism. I will follow this thread through Charles S. Peirce’s, William James’, and John Dewey’s theories of inquiry and truth, Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics, James’ radical pluralism, Dewey’s cultural naturalism, Richard Rorty’s anti-essentialism, Jane Addams’ standpoint epistemology, W.E.B. Du Bois’ theory of race consciousness, Horace Kallen’s and Alain LeRoy Locke’s cultural pluralism, and Mary Parker Follett’s account of pluralistic integration. (shrink)