The subject to be interrogated is the problem of the extent to which differences in meaning across cultural experiences often affect translation and the chances of human communication. This is particularly significant in a world currently plagued by oppression, domination, colonialism, conflicts, prejudices, intolerance, discrimination, inequity and misconceptions.We are examining the issue of the perception that difference is a threat to cooperation, harmony and dialogue among peoples and institutions of the world. The aim of this study is to philosophically examine (...) this idea and to show that cultural difference could be a tool for building up a world where the much required values of harmony, respect for others, reciprocity and cooperation can be established using philosophical arguments by prominent or eminent African philosophers such as Wiredu and Diop amongothers. Methodologically, this study is necessary because there is a need to examine the philosophical dimensions of this issue from an African philosophical viewpoint. Wiredu pushes the argument from cultural universals while Diop makes a case for a cultural and historical basis of difference. Our key finding has been to show that there are some key philosophical theoriesthat go beyond the views of Wiredu and Diop among others. The idea is to anchor difference on a set of moral values needed for establishing enduring intercultural dialogue on an ethical foundation. The work identifies for instance, tolerance, mutual recognition, compromise and human dignity as pillars of enduring mutually respectful intercultural communication. (shrink)

This essay addresses various issues about interpretive social investigation that arise in recent books by Berel Lerner and by Mark Risjord. The general topics considered are the relation between interpretation and explanation, the explanation of action, and alternative rationalities. Part 1 centers on Risjord’s attempt to draw interpretation into the explanatory enterprise, among other things pointing out the limiting assumptions of his account and asking whether social investigation has epistemologically significant practical ends. Part 2 addresses the roles of normativity and (...) rationality in explanations of action, taking up (1) a disagreement between Risjord and David Henderson on normativity, and (2) Lerner’s account of Winch’s appropriation of Wittgenstein’s idea of expressive action. Part 3, finally, endorses Lerner’s and Risjord’s version of the claim that rationality has multiple criteria while also suggesting that intelligibility, not rationality, lies at the heart of many debates on interpretive social science. (shrink)