In this article, I will present a construction of a Nishitanian ethics of sympathy primarily based on passages from Nishitani Keiji’s principal work of his middle period Religion and Nothingness (Shūkyō to ha nani『宗教とは何か』). To establish the normativity of Nishitani’s concept of sympathy I will present his concept of force (chikara 力) as its basis. I will argue that the role of force has been hereto overlooked in the analysis of Nishitani’s concept of circuminsessional relations which has impaired the task (...) of constructing an ethical theory from his thought. I will primarily engage with Brett Davis’s work on circuminsessional relations to demonstrate this point, as I believe he has provided the most robust account of it thus far. After establishing this construction, I aim to elucidate the relative advantages of Nishitanian ethics of sympathy and address potential critiques. First, I will position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as responding to Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion. Nietzsche's critique is strong and that responding to him on Nishitanian grounds will be useful in demonstrating the advantages of my construction. Next, I will respond to a critique given in Peter-Hans Liederbach’s ‘Between the Ontological and the Ontic’ that accuses Nishitani’s philosophy of being unable to offer a basis for ethics. Lastly, I wish to position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as a starting point for expanding the tradition of sympathy-based morality in East Asian philosophy. I will do this by relating Nishitani’s concept of sympathy to Justin Tiwald’s work on sympathy in Confucianism. (shrink)