Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...) which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play. (shrink)

The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) reasons, for deductive arguments, e.g., semantic tableaux are suggested. (shrink)

This essay has two connected theses. First, that given the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adversariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversariality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist view of reasons, the primary objection to argumentative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem, can be answered.

A permissivist framework is developed to include images in the reconstruction of the evidential base and of the theoretical content. The paper uses Newton’s optical theory as a case study to discuss mathematical idealizations and depictions of experiments, together with textual correlates of diagrams. Instead of assuming some specific type of theoretical content, focus is on novel traits that are delineable when studying the carriers of a theory. The framework is developed to trace elliptic and ambiguous message design, and utilizes (...) variegated acceptance as an asset. Newton’s resources allowed for various framing modes and reconstructions, entailing various judgements concerning the theoretical content, the evidence base, and Newton’s use of mathematics. Elliptic presentation of the theory’s proof-structure and ambiguities influenced uptake, contributed to the process of opinion-polarization, and the acceptance/rejection of the theory. The study suggests that the analysed carriers of theoretical content have an argumentative function, and one of their uses is to adjust the burden of proof. (shrink)

When a new theory of argumentation becomes available on the English-speaking market, such as it is happening now through the translation of Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument, it is always interesting to work out how the new input will interact with the work that has otherwise been done in the field. This comment aims to determine whether rhetoric has a place in Wohlrapp’s account of argumentation.

This introduction frames the contents of the special issue in terms of the arguments presented to us by contemporary media.

Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the legal record on civil litigation from mid-March 2020 to mid-July 2021 and examine COVID-19 pandemic-related arguments in a sample of litigated cases heard in Polish courts, more precisely 41 cases. In an attempt to establish the number and types of court cases in which such arguments have been raised, the population of individual case records was accessed electronically from the Ordinary Courts Judgments Portal. The analysed research material consists of texts of (...) written justifications published along with rulings of courts of the first instance in the Portal, except for texts regarding criminal cases and widely understood labour cases. This paper refers to certain theoretical aspects of argument and argumentation. Then, it sheds light on the use of COVID-19 pandemic-related arguments by the parties involved in litigation—as reported by the courts in written justifications—considering, amongst others, whether those arguments were found convincing by the courts. Based on a survey of relevant cases, an attempt was made to identify categories of COVID-19 pandemic-related arguments of the parties involved in litigation, raised in their legal submissions. Also a look into the tendencies in this regard was taken to see whether any patterns emerge and it is possible to discern different trends in the analysed phenomena. The point of the analysis in this article is both descriptive and normative. (shrink)

At a recent rally, Donald Trump resumed a habit he had developed during his election-rallies and read out the lyrics to a song. It tells the Aesopian fable of The Farmer and the Snake: A half frozen snake is taken in by a kind-hearted person but bites them the moment it is revived. Trump tells the fable to make a point about Islamic immigrants and undocumented immigrants from Southern and Central America: He claims the immigrants will cause problems and much (...) stricter immigration-policies are needed. I assume that Trump treats the fable as an argumentative device for supporting his stance on immigration. He uses it as a source-analogue both for the conclusion that immigrants will cause problems and for changing the frame in which immigrants and those willing to let them enter are seen. This gives me opportunity to examine the effect fables have as argumentative devices. Fables are a popular and effective choice for political argumentation. They are slimmed down, semi-abstract narratives, well suited for directing the audience's attention to a few properties of an otherwise complex situation. However, this also makes it easy to use them for manipulating an audience into oversimplifying complex contexts and stereotyping human beings. (shrink)

Woods and Walton deserve credit for including a discussion of “economic reasoning” and its susceptibility to the “fallacy of composition.” Unfortunately, they did not sufficiently pursue the topic, and argumentation scholars have apparently ignored their pioneering effort. Yet, obviously, economic argumentation is extremely important, and economists constantly harp on this fallacy. This paper calls attention to this problem, elaborating my own approach, which is empirical, historical, and meta-argumentational.

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, (...) and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for inferring an inference. Referring to the recent work of Harald Wolhrapp, I will explore the allegation that a faulty logicism is involved when argument analysis is based on an explicit statement of premises and conclusion. In developing this account, reference will also be made to the work of Douglas Walton, Marcello Guarini, Trudy Govier, and Lilian Bermejo-Luque. (shrink)