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  1. Individual Responsibility within Organizational Contexts.Robert F. Card - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (4):397-405.
    Actions within organizational contexts should be understood differently as compared with actions performed outside of such contexts. This is the case due to the agentic shift, as discussed by social psychologist Stanley Milgram, and the role that systemic factors play in shaping the available alternatives from which individuals acting within institutions choose. The analysis stemming from Milgram’s experiments suggests not simply that individuals temporarily abdicate their moral agency on occasion, but that there is an erosion of agency within organizations. The (...)
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  • Seeking a Variable Standard of Individual Moral Responsibility in Organizations.Michael Skerker - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):209-222.
    Relatively few authors attempt to assess individuals’ moral responsibility for collective action within organizations. I draw on fairly technical recent work by Seamus Miller, Christopher Kutz, and Tracy Isaacs in the field of collective responsibility to see what normative lessons can be prepared for people considering entry into large hierarchical, compartmentalized organizations like businesses or the military. I will defend a view shared by Isaacs that group members’ responsibility for collective action depends on intentions to contribute to particular collective actions, (...)
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  • Handbook of philosophy of management.Cristina Neesham & Steven Segal (eds.) - 2019
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  • Apologising for the past: German science and nazi medicine.Damian Grace - 2002 - Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (1):31-42.
    Recently, religious organisations, governments and public institutions have begun to offer apologies for historical wrongs. Can they legitimately do so? Departing from the tendency, Professor Hubert Markl, President of the Max Planck Society, has offered strong reasons for not apologising for the crimes of medical scientists who experimented on human subjects during the Nazi era. He argues that only the perpetrators can meaningfully apologise. Markl’'s position is considered and rejected in favour of the view that apologies by proxy for historical (...)
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