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  1. (1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...)
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  • Brain-Computer Interfaces and the Translation of Thought into Action.Tom Buller - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):155-165.
    A brain-computer interface designed to restore motor function detects neural activity related to intended movement and thereby enables a person to control an external device, for example, a robotic limb, or even their own body. It would seem legitimate, therefore, to describe a BCI as a system that translates thought into action. This paper argues that present BCI-mediated behavior fails to meet the conditions of intentional physical action as proposed by causal and non-causal theories of action. First, according to the (...)
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  • On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):324-342.
    Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept (...)
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  • Neuroethical Consciousness.Tom Buller - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (3):191-194.
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  • The where of bodily awareness.Alisa Mandrigin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1887-1903.
    In bodily awareness body parts are felt to occupy locations relative to the rest of the body. Bodily sensations are felt to be, in Brian O’Shaughnessy’s terms ‘in-a-certain-body-part-at-a-position-in-body-relative-physical-space’. In this paper I put forward a dispositional account of the structure of the spatial content of bodily awareness, which takes inspiration from Gareth Evans’s account of egocentric spatial content in The Varieties of Reference. On the Dispositional View, bodily awareness experiences have spatial content in virtue of a set of connections having (...)
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  • On Proprioception in Action: Multimodality versus Deafferentation.Hong Yu Wong - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):259-282.
    Recent research on proprioception reveals that it relies on a systematically distorted model of bodily dimensions. This generates a puzzle about proprioception in action control: action requires accurate bodily parameters. Proprioception is crucial for ordinary action, but if it relies on a systematically distorted body model, then proprioception should contain systematic errors. But we cannot respond by discarding proprioception from motor control, since we know from the severe problems deafferented agents face in acting that ordinary action requires proprioception. The solution (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is the body represented in everyday bodily activities?Luis Alejandro Murillo Lara - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):591-604.
    There seem to be good reasons to think that there must be body representations or some kind of body content required for riding a bike or grabbing a cup of coffee. However, when I ride a bike or grab a cup of coffee, am I just representing the bike and the cup? Or am I actually also representing my body and bodily movements? The thesis of this paper is that the body not only figures in the content that guides everyday (...)
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  • Editorial: Owning a Body + Moving a Body = Me?Lorenzo Pia, Francesca Garbarini, Andreas Kalckert & Hong Yu Wong - 2019 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 13:448890.
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