While previous authors have broadly examined the motivations and outcomes of the philanthropic activities of organizations, the present study extends Miska et al.’s rationalistic approach to examine the degree to which managerial philanthropic decision-making behaviour is dominated by morality. This study also tackles the question of whether this relationship is moderated by the strength of the geographical proximity and amount of the donation within an agency framework. To probe the radical agency problem and the effect of intervention, an alternative heuristic (...) scenario is also developed to provide evidence that managers under the same moral level show significant differences in donation intention under a variety of agency conditions. The results indicate a significant difference between the existence and non-existence of agency problems in charitable decision-making by managers high in idealism and relativism; however, at the same time, philanthropic behaviour is intertwined with various dilemma-related contexts. These findings bridge the gap in the literature on ethics and corporate social responsibility, and challenge current thinking on corporate governance mechanisms in this area by offering researchers and practitioners an integrated model that responds to a strong sceptical bias or a high premium placed on morality. (shrink)

Why do marketing managers in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and China often engage in competitively irrational behavior, choosing pricing strategies that damage competitors’ profits, rather than choosing pricing strategies that improve their firm’s profits? We propose one possible reason, the moral vacuum created by the collapse of communist ideology. We hypothesize and find that managers who experienced formal communist moral ideological indoctrination are less likely to be competitively irrational than the post-communist managers who did not. Implications are discussed.

Director compensation can potentially represent an ethical minefield. When faced with supporting strategic decisions that can lead to an increase in director pay, directors may consider their own interests and not solely those of the shareholders to whom they are legally bound to represent. In such cases, directors essentially become agents, rather than those installed to protect principals (shareholders) from agents. Using acquisitions as a study context, we employ a matched-pair design and find a statistically significant difference in outside director (...) compensation between acquiring and control firms. Outside directors of acquiring firms earn more than twice as much as their counterparts in the matched-sample. (shrink)