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Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect

Faith and Philosophy 21 (1):3-24 (2004)

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Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131-152.details Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by 'scientific' and 'theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
The Likelihood of Actions and the Neurobiology of Virtues: Veto and Consent Power.Claudia Navarini - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):309-323.details An increasing number of studies indicate that virtues affect brain structure. These studies might shed new light on some neuroethical perspectives suggesting that our brain network activity determines the acquisition and permanence of virtues. According to these perspectives, virtuous behavior could be interpreted as the product of a brain mechanism supervised by genes and environment and not as the result of free choice. In this respect, the neural correlates of virtues would confirm the deterministic theory. In contrast, I maintain that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can.James Hutton - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):106.details Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.details Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge.Stewart Clem - 2008 - Dissertation, Oklahoma State Universitydetails Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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