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  1. The Skill Model: A Dilemma for Virtue Ethics.Nick Schuster - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):447-461.
    According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue, according to which virtue involves essentially the same kind of practical (...)
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  • Introduction: Symposium on Stichter’s The Skillfulness of Virtue.Noell Birondo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):545-547.
    The ‘skill model’ of virtue has received increasing levels of attention over the past decade, at least partly due to its prominence in the work of Julia Annas. Building on this earlier work, some of which is his own, Matt Stichter now delivers a bold and empirically grounded new book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, an extended defense of the skill model of virtue that utilizes the available psychological research on self-regulation and practical expertise. Stichter examines the idea (familiar in antiquity) (...)
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  • Aristotle and Expertise: Ideas on the Skillfulness of Virtue.Noell Birondo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):599-609.
    Many philosophers working on virtue theory have resisted the idea that the virtues are practical skills, apparently following Aristotle’s resistance to that idea. Bucking the trend, Matt Stichter defends a strong version of this idea in The Skillfulness of Virtue by marshaling a wide range of conceptual and empirical arguments to argue that the moral virtues are robust skills involving the cognitive-conative unification of Aristotelian phronêsis (‘practical intelligence’). Here I argue that Aristotle overlooks a more delimited kind of practical intelligence, (...)
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