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  1. The credit incentive to be a maverick.Remco Heesen - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 76:5-12.
    There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue (...)
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  • Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique.James W. McAllister - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 12 (2):239-258.
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  • Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited.K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):61-73.
    I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared standards. I argue (...)
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  • Thomas Samuel Kuhn3, o bioeticista”: fantasias heterônimas em busca de valores não-epistêmicos.Márcio Rojas Da Cruz & Gabriele Cornelli - 2011 - Filosofia Unisinos 12 (2).
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  • Kuhn's alternative path: Science and the social resistance to criticism.Stephanie Solomon - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (3):352-368.
    Popper: I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; and we can at any moment break out of it again.Kuhn: If that possibility were routinely available, (...)
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  • The adaptive landscape of science.John S. Wilkins - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (5):659-671.
    In 1988, David Hull presented an evolutionary account of science. This was a direct analogy to evolutionary accounts of biological adaptation, and part of a generalized view of Darwinian selection accounts that he based upon the Universal Darwinism of Richard Dawkins. Criticisms of this view were made by, among others, Kim Sterelny, which led to it gaining only limited acceptance. Some of these criticisms are, I will argue, no longer valid in the light of developments in the formal modeling of (...)
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  • The cognition dimension of theory change in Kuhn’s philosophy of science.K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):610-613.
    This is an essay review of Andersen, Barker and Chen's The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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