Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Imagination and Experimentalism in Hume’s Philosophy.Andrew Ward - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):165-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume and the fiction of personal identity.Francisco Pereira Gandarillas - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (154):191-213.
    La interpretación estándar de la teoría humeana sobre la identidad personal suele aceptar dos tesis importantes: (T1) no existe un yo o mente dotada de simplicidad e identidad perfecta; (T2) Hume defiende una teoría metafísica específica acerca de la naturaleza del yo o de la mente, según la cual esta es solo un haz de percepciones. Se argumenta que ambas afirmaciones, son falsas. Su aceptación comprometería a Hume con una forma de dogmatismo epistémico y metafísico incompatible con su filosofía experimental. (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Skeptical Cartesian Background of Hume's "of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy".José R. Maia Neto - 2015 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 56 (132):371-392.
    ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ignorance and Evidence in Hume Scholarship.John P. Wright - 1987 - Dialogue 26 (4):731.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations