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McDowell’s Oscillation

Crispin Wright & John McDowell

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):395 (1998)

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Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given.Refeng Tang - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):101-122.details The motivation for McDowell’s conceptualism is an epistemological consideration. McDowell believes conceptualism would guarantee experience a justificatory role in our belief system and we can then avoid the Myth of the Given without falling into coherentism. Conceptualism thus claims an epistemological advantage over nonconceptualism. The epistemological advantage of conceptualism is not to be denied. But both Sellars and McDowell insist experience is not belief. This makes it impossible for experience to justify empirical knowledge, for the simple reason that what is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.details Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 78 citations
The Argument from the finer‐grained content of colour experiences A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non‐conceptual theorists.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.details In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience has to be redefined. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision.Josefa Toribio - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):621-642.details (2014). Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 621-642. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893386. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Non-passivity of perceptual experience.Isabelle Peschard - 2010 - Contemporary Pragmatism 7 (1):149-164.details The main problems faced by a conception of perception as passive will be introduced through a critical examination of John McDowell's account of 'empirical thinking'. Overcoming these difficulties will lead to a conception of perception as involving an active cognitive participation of the perceiver, and an account of how observational judgment is warranted that is focused on the conditions of experience. In both cases, analogies to inquiry in scientific experimental practice will be explored. Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Sellars vs. the given.Daniel Bonevac - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):1-30.details John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars’s arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars’s arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument-the “inconsistent triad” argument-addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations

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