Recent developments in AI-research suggest that an AI-driven science might not be that far off. The research of for Melnikov et al. (2018) and that of Evans et al. (2018) show that automated systems can already have a distinctive role in the design of experiments and in directing future research. Common practice in many of the papers devoted to the automation of basic research is to refer to these automated systems as ‘agents’. What is this attribution of agency based on (...) and to what extent is this an important notion in the broader context of an AI-driven science? In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper proposes a new methodological framework, introduced as the Four-Fold Framework, that can be used to conceptualize artificial agency in basic research. It consists of four modeling strategies, three of which were already identified and used by Sarkia (2021) to conceptualize ‘intentional agency’. The novelty of the framework is the inclusion of a fourth strategy, introduced as conceptual modeling, that adds a semantic dimension to the overall conceptualization. The strategy connects to the other strategies by modeling both the actual use of ‘artificial agency’ in basic research as well as what is meant by it in each of the other three strategies. This enables researchers to bridge the gap between theory and practice by comparing the meaning of artificial agency in both an academic as well as in a practical context. (shrink)

SummaryAnti‐Realism claims that the Classical or Realist conception of truth as verification‐transcendent is incoherent. Our grasp of the meanings of statements from any given class is to be assimilated to a grasp of their assertibility or deniability conditions. In this paper I present an apparent counter‐example to the Anti‐Realist's positive claim which derives from the traditional problem of other minds.ResumeL'anti‐réalisme affirme ľincohérence de la conception réaliste classique de la vérité comme transcendante à la vérification. Notre saisie des significations des énoncés (...) ? une classe donnáe quelconque doit être assimilée à la saisie des conditions dans lesquelles ils peuvent être affirmés ou niés. Dans cet article, je présente un apparent contre‐exemple, tiré du problème traditionnel de l'existence ? autres sujets, à la thèse positive des anti‐réalistes.ZusammenfassungDer Antirealist behauptet, dass die klassische realistische Auffassung der Wahrheit als einer der Prüfung unzugänglichen Begriffes unhaltbar sei. Um die Bedeutungen irgendwelcher Aussagen verstehen zu können, mussen wir die Bedingungen ihrer Behauptbarkeit kennen. Ich lege ein offenbares Gegenbeispiel zur These des Antirealisten vor, das sich aus dem traditionellen Problem des Fremdbewusstseins ergibt. (shrink)

The role of criteria in Wittgenstein’s philosophy The main objective of this article is to explain the role of the concept of a ‘criterion’ in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. To do so, the author juxtaposes a few well‑known interpretations of this issue, and compares the notion of a criterion with the notion of a rule. Contrary to Peter M.S. Hacker’s reading, he points out that according to Wittgenstein, to give the ‘criteria of use’ of an expression is to determine its ‘grammar’. (...) To meet the criteria does not merely mean justifying the fact that a given thing occurs, but means that a given expression has an application under the particular conditions. Thus, there is no difference between the determination of the criteria of an expression’s use and the explication of its meaning. It should be noted that the fact that the expression ‘x’ has an application in a given situation does not always imply that the sentence ‘this is x’ is also true in this situation. The Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion is a semantical rather than an epistemological concept. Therefore, the conceived criteria cannot be used to reject scepticism, if by rejecting it we mean demonstrating its falsity. According to Wittgenstein, we can show at most that a sceptic, who rejects all criteria of use of words, cannot frame any doubts. (shrink)

This paper concerns the Russian émigrée translator and philosopher Natalie Duddington (1886–1972). By establishing Duddington’s dependence on Nicholas Lossky (1870–1965), the paper argues that Duddington formed a unique synthesis of Russian intuitivism and British realism in her essay ‘Our Knowledge of Other Minds’. Despite the historical significance of Duddington’s work, it will be concluded that her synthesis succumbs to the most recent criticism which has been posed against perceptualists such as Fred Dretske (1932–2013). Russian ‘intuitivism’ is understood here as the (...) school of thought that was first developed by Lossky and subsequently inherited by Duddington. ‘Perceptualism’ will be understood as the broad claim that we perceive the contents of another mind in an immediate way rather than infer them. (shrink)