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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung
Les Etudes Philosophiques 20 (1):109-109 (1965)
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In this paper, I consider Baumgarten’s views on the soul in the context of the Pietist critique of Wolff’s rational psychology. My primary aim is to account for the largely unacknowledged differences between Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s rational psychology, though I also hope to show that, in some cases, the Pietists were rather more perceptive in their reading of Wolff than they are typically given credit for as their criticisms frequently succeed in drawing attention to significant omissions in Wolff’s discussion. |
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En este artículo se analiza la doctrina kantiana de la definición. Se estudia el desarrollo de esa doctrina en las lecciones de lógica del período precrítico, a partir de su comparación con la teoría de las definiciones de Meier. Se sostiene que Kant organiza su estudio a partir de los aspectos escogidos por Meier, pero es crítico de sus tesis. |
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What awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber? On the traditional narrative, he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of causal connections. A more recent narrative claims that he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of non‐logical connections more generally. In this paper, I argue that a key part of Kant's awakening was far wider‐reaching: he came to realize that all dogmas must be abandoned. An oft‐overlooked technical notion, dogmas are non‐logical principles cognizable to unaided human reason. (...) |
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Broadly defined as adherence to teachings of Christian Wolff (1679–1754), Wolffianism characterized much of the mainstream of German academic philosophy for at least half the eighteenth century. German Pietism, by contrast, defined in its narrowest sense as a late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century movement for the renewal of the Lutheran Churches of the Holy Roman Empire, has long figured in the history of German “Enlightenment” philosophy as Wolffianism’s anti-philosophical, religious foil. The conventional portrait of Wolffianism and Pietism as antithetical to one another, (...) |
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This article reveals the critical content of the idea of scientific revolution in Wolff's philosophy and shows Leibniz's contribution to its formation. Although Wolff's goal was to reform the method of philosophizing on the model of Euclid's geometry, which was based on the Cartesian idea of achieving certainty by clarifying concepts, this clarification Wolff in the sense of Leibniz sees in such an analysis of concepts that would accurately establish a connection between them and show the possibility of the object (...) |
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‘Enlightenment’ (in German, ‘Aufklärung’) is not simply the name of a movement or development whose existence is uncontroversial. Rather, the claim ‘The 18th century was the age of enlightenment’ or ‘In Germany, there was the Enlightenment’ entail certain claims which need to be discussed. This article argues that some of these claims are false and that therefore the claim ‘The Enlightenment does not exist’ is true. |
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Christian Wolff’s attitude towards Leibniz’s legacy is a notoriously vexed question in the history of eighteenth-century German philosophy. In reaction against the untenable traditional depiction o... |
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The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate (...) |
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This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as (...) |
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In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s criticisms of (...) |
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Las filosofías de Wolff y Baumgarten han sido tradicionalmente evaluadas como una mera sistematización de las doctrinas de Leibniz, carente de toda originalidad. Se revisa esta opinión, concentrándose en el problema específico de la interacción de las sustancias naturales. Se muestra que ellos no siguen a Leibniz con el mismo grado de cercanía en algunos de los principios centrales de la teoría de la armonía preestablecida. Se problematiza así el uso de la etiqueta "leibnizianismo" como referida a un cuerpo homogéneo (...) |
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