Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach (...) to practically all philosophical problems; (ii) his treating of the concepts relation, structure (constructions) and order; (iii) the discussion of the concepts of states of affairs, multiple theory of judgment, general logical form; (iv) some common themes like panpsychism and contemplating the world sub specie aeternitatis. (shrink)

The journal Mind is now a wholly philosophical journal. At the time of its founding, in 1876, however, its mission was rather different in character. Its aim was to discover whether scientific psychology was a truly viable enterprise and, if so, what its boundaries with philosophy, with other scientific disciplines, and with the earlier generation of discredited attempts at `scientific' studies of the mind (e.g. phrenology, mesmerism) might be. Although at first Mind published mostly philosophical pieces and literature reviews, by (...) the mid-1880s it was publishing primary experimental research, mostly by American psychologists who as yet had few outlets of their own. For a time it was the leading journal of experimental psychology in the English-speaking world. As the international competition among scientific and scholarly journals intensified in the 1890s, however, Mind started to lose its share of experimental contributions, and with the editorial takeover of the journal of George Stout in 1892, the journal soon became one dedicated purely to philosophy. (shrink)

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) fut un des derniers grands esprits encyclopédiques de l’Allemagne du tournant du xxe siècle. Adepte d’une psychologie scientifique, il établit dès le début des années 1860 une distinction opérationnelle entre la Psychologie expérimentale et la Völkerpsychologie. Les intellectuels français (e.g. Ribot, Durkheim) vont rapidement être séduits tout d’abord par son œuvre physiologique, puis surtout par son œuvre psychologique et être intéressés par son approche philosophique et métaphysique. Mais il n’est resté que peu de choses jusqu’à présent dans (...) la pensée psychologique, sociologique et philosophique françaises de l’œuvre de Wundt, qui mériterait néanmoins un ré-examen approfondi. (shrink)