This study comparatively examines the dividends behavior in state-controlled firms versus family-controlled firms. With the sample of large industrial firms listed on the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange, we investigate the dividends payment rates, stability of dividends payment, the effects of firm size, profitability and growth opportunity on likelihood to pay dividends, as well as the concentration of dividend in state-controlled versus family-controlled firms. Based on the findings, we derive some ethical implications of dividends policy regarding the differences (...) in business ethical behavior, corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, business sustainability, and shareholder activism in state-controlled versus family-controlled firms, as well as the improvement in these respects through cross-listing in Hong Kong. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This manuscript develops the concept of organizational virtue orientation (OVO) and examines differences between family and non-family firms on the six organizational virtue dimensions of Integrity, Empathy, Warmth, Courage, Conscientiousness, and Zeal. Using content analysis of shareholder letters fromS&P 500companies, our analyses find that there are significant differences between family and non-family firms in their espoused OVO, with family firms generally being higher. Specifically, family firms were significantly higher on the dimensions of Empathy, Warmth, and Zeal, but lower on Courage. (...) Based on these findings we further develop the OVO concept through the discussion of implications and areas for future research. (shrink)

This study adds to the theory of family business management by exploring the effects of family ownership on the corporate misconduct of small firms in the United States. The empirical findings indicate that small family-owned firms are less likely to commit misconduct than small non-family-owned firms. We interpret this finding as family firms aiming to achieve the trans-generational succession of moral capital. Further investigation shows a nonlinear family-ownership–misconduct relationship. A negative relationship between them only appears in mature firms. We further (...) show that for relatively mature firms, only family firms with older owners are less likely to commit corporate misconduct. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between family control and young entrepreneurial firm’s bribing behavior around the globe. Relying on over 2,000 young firms from the World Bank Environment Survey, we find that family control helps to reduce a firm’s bribery behavior, but further investigation shows that this effect only exists in countries with weaker macro-governance environment. In countries with more established and transparent governance mechanism, family control does not seem to make any difference. We interpret our findings as the business (...) family’s preservation of socioemotional wealth. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This manuscript develops the concept of organizational virtue orientation (OVO) and examines differences between family and non-family firms on the six organizational virtue dimensions of Integrity, Empathy, Warmth, Courage, Conscientiousness, and Zeal. Using content analysis of shareholder letters fromS&P 500companies, our analyses find that there are significant differences between family and non-family firms in their espoused OVO, with family firms generally being higher. Specifically, family firms were significantly higher on the dimensions of Empathy, Warmth, and Zeal, but lower on Courage. (...) Based on these findings we further develop the OVO concept through the discussion of implications and areas for future research. (shrink)

How do individuals respond when they perceive that their family business has been built upon unethical business conduct? Drawing on an expanded version of Hirschman’s typology of generic responses to declining situations (Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1970), which includes responses of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect, we offer a model that predicts probability of intended response behavior as a function of normative obligation (i.e., what one perceives ought (...) to be done), managerial discretion (i.e., what one perceives can be done), and successor commitment to the firm. The model is tested on 124 business school students exposed to a scenario depicting an inherited ethical dilemma occurring in a family business from Arthur Miller’s play All My Sons, and shows support for elements of the proposed framework. Most notable is a significant negative relationship between normative firm-directed commitment and the response of Neglect. (shrink)

There is a dearth of business ethics research on family firms, despite the importance of such firms to the US economy. We answer Vazquez’s call to examine the intersection of family-firm research and business ethics, by investigating whether external auditors assess higher risk of fraud in family firms. We test the contradictory predictions of two dominant theoretical perspectives in family-firm research—entrenchment theory and alignment theory. We conduct an experiment with highly experienced external audit professionals, who assess the risk of fraud (...) and make client acceptance decisions for family firms versus non-family firms with different strength of corporate governance: strong versus weak audit committees. We find that auditors assess the risk of fraud as higher for family firms than for non-family firms, consistent with the predictions of entrenchment theory. Auditors are also less likely to make client acceptance recommendations for family firms. The strength of the AC moderates the family-firm effect, whereby auditors assess family firms with weak ACs to have the highest fraud risk and to be the least desirable audit clients. Our findings suggest that auditors perceive more severe agency conflicts to be present in family firms than in non-family firms, consistent with entrenchment theory, according to which family members may behave opportunistically to extract rents and potentially expropriate the firm’s resources at the expense of minority shareholders. (shrink)