Divine revelation is a topical subject, given the many claims to revelation in the modern world. This article looks at recent discussion within the analytic tradition of philosophy which particularly relates to how to evaluate claims about divine revelation. The subjects covered are: defining divine revelation; direct cognition of God; evidence‐based approaches; divine testimony; conversion and faith; competing claims about divine revelation. Brief comments are then made on some related areas.

In recent years, there have been a number of philosophical publications focusing on spirituality. But even in pertinent philosophical texts it is rare to find attempts at shaping a workable definition of spirituality, despite the obvious need for a clear definition for the philosophical debate on spirituality. This paper addresses the major issues in shaping a satisfactory definition of spirituality: an understanding of spirituality as transcendence of critical reasoning, the broadness of the concept, the implications of various scholarly backgrounds and (...) the challenge of avoiding a circular definition. It suggests a rough clustering of common approaches into ontological, ethical, and functional definitions and discusses their weaknesses. It is argued that an inclusive, metaphysically parsimonious, and stipulative definition is the best way to address typical difficulties and avoid weaknesses of common definitions. Finally, it proposes a definition based on meaning, a term that often appears in the discussion of spirituality. It is suggested that understanding meaning in the ordinary sense of the word might be a good starting point to arrive at a satisfactory definition of spirituality. (shrink)

Matthew Ratcliffe has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings (...) and intentional experience remains ambiguous. Third, viewed in light of existential guilt, the categorically non-conceptual nature of existential feelings may not be as definite as presumed. The aim of the article is to draw critical attention to aspects of the theory that would benefit from further development, and therefore, to advance the ongoing discussion about existential feelings. (shrink)

I argue that empirical studies into the phenomenon of religious conversion suffer from conceptual unclarity owing to an absence of philosophical contributions. I examine the relationship between definition and empirical result in the social sciences, and I show that a wide divergence in conceptual approach threatens to undermine the possibility of useful comparative study. I stake out a distinctive role for philosophical treatments of studies into religious conversion. I conclude with the suggestion that use of the terms ‘convert’ and ‘conversion’ (...) may not in fact be conducive to clarity in the present context, and that subsequent studies may improve their precision through replacing them. (shrink)