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  1. Three varieties of mathematical structuralism.Geoffrey Hellman - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (2):184-211.
    Three principal varieties of mathematical structuralism are compared: set-theoretic structuralism (‘STS’) using model theory, Shapiro's ante rem structuralism invoking sui generis universals (‘SGS’), and the author's modal-structuralism (‘MS’) invoking logical possibility. Several problems affecting STS are discussed concerning, e.g., multiplicity of universes. SGS overcomes these; but it faces further problems of its own, concerning, e.g., the very intelligibility of purely structural objects and relations. MS, in contrast, overcomes or avoids both sets of problems. Finally, it is argued that the modality (...)
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  • Critical studies/book review. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (2):231-237.
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  • Does category theory provide a framework for mathematical structuralism?Geoffrey Hellman - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):129-157.
    Category theory and topos theory have been seen as providing a structuralist framework for mathematics autonomous vis-a-vis set theory. It is argued here that these theories require a background logic of relations and substantive assumptions addressing mathematical existence of categories themselves. We propose a synthesis of Bell's many-topoi view and modal-structuralism. Surprisingly, a combination of mereology and plural quantification suffices to describe hypothetical large domains, recovering the Grothendieck method of universes. Both topos theory and set theory can be carried out (...)
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  • Word and objects.Agustín Rayo - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):436–464.
    The aim of this essay is to show that the subject-matter of ontology is richer than one might have thought. Our route will be indirect. We will argue that there are circumstances under which standard first-order regimentation is unacceptable, and that more appropriate varieties of regimentation lead to unexpected kinds of ontological commitment.
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