This article examines whether restrictions on access to welfare rights for EU immigrants are justifiable on grounds of reciprocity. Recently political theorists have supported some robust restricti...

In the last few decades, residency in some of the world’s desired destination cities has become a privilege, as housing supply has not kept pace with population growth. This has led to a significant rise in housing prices and consequently to the exclusion of middle- and low-income populations on a large scale. These developments have received only scant attention in political theory despite their prominence in local policymaking and their contribution to processes of redrawing the boundaries of inclusion into local (...) political communities. My focus in this article is on the question ‘is it morally permissible for cities to sort members by economic means, and grant the better-off privileged access to residency?’ I explore this question by examining the main arguments used to support the city’s right to selectively admit would-be members. This allows me to delineate the limitations of the city’s general duty to be accessible to all segments of society and to present particular cases where the city has special obligations to incorporate nonmembers. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 480-495, December 2021.

It is often believed that domestic principles of justice cannot ground freedom of international movement. Some argue that since principles of justice are not global in scope, justice does not require freedom of movement at the global level. This is problematic, for it confuses the grounds with the scope of justice. Given that the scope of justice is potentially global, freedom of movement must also be global in scope. Others have argued that the grounds of freedom of movement themselves are (...) restricted in scope. If cooperation, democracy, and coercion are what presumably ground the right to freedom of movement, to the extent that they are not global in scope, freedom of movement need not be global in scope either. In this article, I argue that even if the grounds of freedom of movement are or should not be global in scope, freedom of movement must be. (shrink)