More and more, we face AI-based products and services. Using these services often requires our explicit consent, e.g., by agreeing to the services’ Terms and Conditions clause. Current advances introduce the ability of AI to evolve and change its own modus operandi over time in such a way that we cannot know, at the moment of consent, what it is in the future to which we are now agreeing. Therefore, informed consent is impossible regarding certain kinds of AI. Call this (...) the problem of radical ignorance. Interestingly, radical ignorance exists in consent contexts other than AI, where it seems that individuals can provide informed consent. The article argues that radical ignorance can undermine informed consent in some contexts but not others because, under certain institutional, autonomy-protecting conditions, consent can be valid without being (perfectly) informed. By understanding these institutional conditions, we can formulate practical solutions to foster valid, albeit imperfectly informed consent across various decision contexts and within different institutions. (shrink)

Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (Econ Philos 38, pp. 221–241, 2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (Philos Public Affairs 50: 202–238, 2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities are in some sense morally problematic. If the state is not called on to regulate pecuniary externalities, then, at the very least, individuals (...) should be conscious of how their productive and consumptive decisions affect others by changing prices. We disagree. Both arguments fail, in that neither gives us reason to think pecuniary externalities are cause for moral concern. Unless a new argument emerges, pecuniary externalities should be left alone. (shrink)

Much business ethics and corporate social responsibility literature suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that firms ought to engage in activities that can be characterized as philanthropy, namely, expending resources beyond what is required by law and market norms to promote others’ welfare at the expense of firm profits. However, this literature has struggled to provide a normative framework for evaluating corporate philanthropy, although scholars have noted that such expenditures can potentially remedy market failures and provide public goods more efficiently. I articulate (...) two specific rationales that can justify corporate philanthropy based on considerations of welfare economics: 1) firms making strategic but high-risk investments in activities that are likely to generate positive externalities even if they prove unprofitable and 2) firms possessing a strong comparative advantage in their ability to address a social problem at lower social cost. Moreover, these rationales can be evaluated by a concept I develop called the philanthropy multiplier, indicating the ratio of net positive externalities to net costs. I suggest that firms consider publicizing their philanthropy multipliers, and I discuss theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

Business owners sometimes refuse to transact with certain customers on principle, given some normative (political, personal, moral, or religious) commitment which they hold. I call such refusals ‘conscientious refusals.’ Evaluating two possible positions on the permissibility of vendor conscientious refusals, I argue in favor of an impersonal market in which vendor conscientious refusals are generally not justified. I argue impersonal norms, which crowd out conscientious considerations, support pluralist, healthy markets from which we reap individual and communal benefits; further, impersonal markets (...) buttress individual freedom by providing a distinctive sphere of activity characterized by norms of radical inclusivity. These considerations constitute a strong case that vendor conscientious refusals are ceteris paribus unjustified. I conclude by addressing several potential objections to this view. (shrink)

Managers often have discretion in interpreting their ethical requirements, and they should seek democratic guidance in doing so. The undemocratic nature of managerial ethical discretion is shown to be a recurring problem in business ethics. Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) is introduced as a theory better positioned to deal with this problem than other views. However, due to epistemic uncertainty and conceptual indeterminacy, the MFA is shown to allow a much wider range of managerial discretion than initially appears. The (...) paper explores how this range can be narrowed down with democratic input, comparing models based on formal state institutions and on the informal public sphere. A case study from the pharmaceutical industry illustrates the merits of the informal public sphere approach. (shrink)

This study explores how being satisfied with one’s life as an entrepreneur is a crucial ethical and psychological outcome of early volition and, subsequently, a vital resource in the development of a richer eudaimonic experience from entrepreneurship. We develop and test our predictions based on two independent datasets: American and Swedish business owners and early stage entrepreneurs. We argue and demonstrate that satisfaction with life as an entrepreneur conveys a distinct state of entrepreneurial well-being and constitutes a crucial self-evaluation which (...) mediates the effects of early volition in entrepreneurship on long-term eudaimonia. We contribute to the emerging conversations on entrepreneurship, business ethics, and well-being. (shrink)