In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and (...) sex, feminist epistemology must register the animal-human dichotomy as a fundamental driving mechanism inherent in epistemic injustice. From the perspective of a truly liberatory epistemology, I thus argue for an expanded account of epistemic injustice that is both 1) sufficiently attentive to the way injustices to human knowers continue to rely on animal oppression and 2) that accommodates epistemic injustices against animal knowers. (shrink)

Margonis (1986) criticizes Heidegger’s philosophy and those who would attempt to adopt his views for the purpose of thinking education because of the "abstract nature of his discussions," which suggest "proposals regarding our political, economic and educational lives from the place of metaphysical argumentation" (p. 125). To the contrary, Dwyer, et al (1988) claim the Heidegger’s philosophy, "clearly suggests an educational theory" (p. 100). This, is perhaps an overly optimistic claim, for it glosses over the difficulty associated with plumbing the (...) depths of Heidegger’s vast corpus in order to speculate on the legitimate potential his philosophy has for contemporary educational practices. It is possible, I suggest, to find meaning in Heidegger’s text as it relates to curriculum study, most specifically in the direction of conceiving educational practices that inspire lucid and legitimate thinking on our ontological potential as humans, which includes our unique possibilities as individuals understood in relation to our solicitous interpersonal relations with others with whom we share the world: Our Being-in-the-world in terms of Being-with-others. This paper falls into three divisions, and unfolds in the attempt to: (1) understand what an authentic existence from an ontological perspective entails; (2) explicate the detrimental effects of das Gestell, or the Enframed "attunement" of modern technology, on our current educational practices and our ontological "potentiality-for-Being"; and (3) analyze literature and English teaching, forms of ontological education (inquiry), as potential means by which to overcome the negative effects of this "technological" trend in contemporary education through understanding what Heidegger wrote about the grounding poietic attunement of art. For according to Heidegger (1971), art opens worlds apart from the ordinary, the everyday; it holds the power to transform us by putting in touch with our "potentiality-for-Being." Indeed, the essence of art lies in "a change, happening from out of the work, of the unconcealedness of what is, and this means, of Being" (p. 72). (shrink)

(2002). Global Nihilism and Local Meanings? Dreyfus on Kierkegaard and Heidegger Today. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 395-401.

This article is about our relationship with things; about the abundant material geographies that surround us and constitute the very possibility for us to be the beings that we are. More specifically, it is about the question of the possibility of an ethical encounter with things (qua things). We argue, with the science and technology studies tradition (and Latour in particular), that we are the beings that we are through our entanglements with things, we are thoroughly hybrid beings, cyborgs through (...) and through – we have never been otherwise. With Heidegger we propose that a human-centred ethics of hybrids will fail to open a space for an ethical encounter with things since all beings in the sociomaterial network – humans and non-human alike – end up circulating as objects, enframed as ‘standing reserve’, things-for-the-purposes-of the network. We suggest that what is needed is an ethos beyond ethics, or the overcoming of an ethics – which is based on the will to power – towards an ethos of letting be. We elaborate such a possibility with the help of Heidegger, in particular with reference to the work of Graham Harman and his notion of ‘tool-being’. From this we propose, very tentatively, an ethos that has as its ground a poetic dwelling with things, a way of being that lets being be (Gelassenheit). We show how such a poetic dwelling, or ethos of Gelassenheit, may constitute the impossible possibility of a very otherwise way of being with things – an ethos of a ‘community of those who have nothing in common’ as suggested by Alphonso Lingis. (shrink)

As part of a religiously-oriented analysis, Martin Buber associates Martin Heidegger’s later philosophy with magic. The present article is dedicated to explicating and evaluating this association. It does so, first, by fleshing out how Buber comes to depict Heidegger as an advocate of magic. Then, by examining other appearances of the category of magic in the wider context of Buber’s dialogical oeuvre, it demonstrates that what he has in mind when he invokes this category is a specific manner of human (...) appeal to the divine marked by manipulation, utility and control. Finally, it evaluates the affiliation of Heidegger with magic: first, by comparing the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding the logic of magic—specifically the conceptions of, and interrelations between, ‘language’ and ‘being’—with Heidegger’s views, and second, by judging whether the claim that Heidegger promotes manipulative, utilitarian, and power-laden attitudes can be justified in light of his analysis of ‘technology’. The article ultimately argues that Buber misattributes magic to Heidegger, and that this misattribution better reflects the theoretical framework through which Buber justifies his dialogical position than an apt assessment of Heidegger’s thought. (shrink)

This article brings together and compares my own artistic practice of drawing/painting and the eighteenth-century novel Tristram Shandy. In both cases, there is a free play of lines, textual or graphic, which sets ‘all things out of rule’. A whole typology of lines is woven throughout Sterne’s text and reappears, alter-inscribed, in the artworks. The article presents an account of these lines: rectilinear, hylomorphic, fractal and nomadic, as well as the line of incision (or the cut). Each is explored as (...) a specific mode of line with differing effects. To follow these lines is to enter a world of material expressivity, to be exposed to an ontology of becoming and change, of flows and transformations, that overturns the traditional ontology of being and stable identity. Sterne’s use of wild digression, doodles and graphisms, establishes certain proximity between writing and drawing. Both may be seen as types of ‘figured metaphysics’ and as ways of bringing something new into the world. The article concludes with some philosophical observations on the strange event of drawing a line, with reference to the work of Heidegger and Deleuze and Guattari. (shrink)