In this article, I assess Jürgen Habermas’s defence of civil disobedience as ’the guardian of legitimacy’ in democratic societies. I suggest that, despite its appeal, the defence as it stands is incomplete. The problem relates to his account of the justification of this mode of protest. Although Habermas wants to defend civil disobedience as a response to inadequacies in deliberative democratic procedures, he does not provide us with a clear and compelling account of these inadequacies. In order to provide such (...) an account, I examine the various ways in which the illegitimate circulation of social power can distort democratic processes. Civil disobedience can be seen as a legitimate response to inequalities in social power, a defence that builds on the strengths of Habermas’s approach while transcending its limitations. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]. (shrink)

Students often find themselves disconnected from foundations courses such as Philosophy of Education, citing the abstract nature of some of the ideas studied and a perceived disconnect from practical issues. Moreover, the place/space of the university classroom itself can be seen to contribute to students? disengagement and stunting of their critical capacities. In this article, we present two intertwined narratives. In one strand, we describe our attempt to secure our students? engagement in our course, Introduction to Philosophy of Education, as (...) well as remedy the forms of interaction that are called out of a university classroom through our employment of what we termed the pedagogical spaces project. This project is built upon the notion of a situated pedagogy and emphasizes a performative stance for students. We present a description of the pedagogical steps undertaken. Intertwined with the first narrative, we also present a mapping of how our very understanding of our project and its goals evolved. Theoretical grounding for our project occurs through theorists such as Howard Cannatella, David A. Gruenewald, John Martin, Harold Rugg, Augusto Boal, Martin Buber, and Mikhail Bakthin. Utilizing excerpts from student self-evaluations, final essays, and insights from theorists such as Megan Boler, we illustrate the ways in which students were able to holistically engage in critical and situated thought about familiar and dominant images of teaching and learning. (shrink)

Educational theorists working within the tradition of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas’s thought, posit teaching to be a site of implied ethics, that is, a realm in which non-violent or less violent relations to the other are possible. Derrida links ethics to the realm of friendship, enabling one to understand teaching as a site of the ethics of friendship. I clarify how friendship, as a re-metaphorization of differance, opens us up to a conception of teaching that provides a counterpoint to (...) the current discourse of ‘effective’ teaching. I draw out the implications of the Derridean conception of friendship for the educator in his or her philosophical orientation towards teaching and attempt to show that friendship points the educator towards an orientation that enables a ‘fine tuning’ and opening up of one’s sense of obligation and responsibility to one’s students in ways that cannot be circumscribed to current or institutionally sanctioned ways of understanding the activity of teaching, especially as it is often envisioned in American public education. (shrink)

Does a victim have to intend to resist oppression in order to discharge her obligation to do so, or is it sufficient to resist oppression intentionally in the course of pursuing other plans and projects of importance to her? I argue that resisting intentionally can be sufficient: given the ways that oppression interferes with the lives of victims, trying to counteract that interference by living the life you want is genuine resistance. Requiring that victims have justice-oriented or agency-preserving reasons before (...) their actions count as resistance will distort or miss a wide range of everyday responses to oppressive burdens. (shrink)

This essay addresses the intersection of ‘urban topography’ and history in shaping the contours of the self and encounters with ‘the other’. It is based on field research in primarily one neighborhood of Beirut – Hamra. Whereas almost all neighborhoods in Beirut are dominated by one sect, Hamra is considered to be the most secular, diverse, and cosmopolitan area in this city. It is the home of several international universities and has nourished a robust public culture. Based on countless hours (...) of observation and conversations as well as formal interviews with dozens of residents, shop owners, and intellectuals, I explore the dynamics of belonging and exclusion in a neighborhood that is imagined as the exemplar of a cosmopolitan culture. In the first section of the essay, I sketch a typology of street cultures, suggesting connections to forms of selfhood. I argue that Hamra’s urban topography, in conjunction with Beirut’s post-civil war history, has formed a self that is not disposed toward open engagement with the other. In the second part of the essay, I analyze patterns of social difference in Hamra, exploring the shape of gender, sexual, and ethnic differences. I consider which differences ‘coalesce’ and what form this takes as well as patterns of incorporation and exclusion. In the third part of the essay, the meaning of cosmopolitanism in an urban context is examined. I explore the notion of cosmopolitanism as a rhetoric of nationalism against both sectarian and Arab nationalism. Finally, in the last section I argue that the confessional basis of power in Lebanon helps explain patterns of social exclusion. This confessional polity encourages a politics of paranoia. (shrink)

Iris Marion Young took a strong stance against humanitarian intervention and other so-called legitimate instances of what she calls ‘official violence’. Nevertheless, she was also aware that there may be some situations for which military humanitarian intervention should at least be considered. Young was concerned that some states will use their obligation to defend against human rights violations as a mechanism in securing or maintaining global dominance. In addition, she recognized that what counts as a violation of human rights is (...) not uncontroversial; human rights norms and conventions are interpreted, negotiated, and otherwise contested. In this article, I build on Young’s arguments for a social connection model of responsibility by applying it to a situation where a forceful response to violence might be justified. I juxtapose Young’s position with the emerging international standard called ‘the responsibility to protect’ in order to suggest an account of intervention for global governance relations. (shrink)

Is equality a distributive value or does it rather point to the quality of social relationships? This article criticizes the distributive character of luck egalitarian theories of justice and fleshes out the central characteristics of an alternative, relational approach to equality. It examines a central objection to distributive theories: that such theories cannot account for the significance of how institutions treat people (as opposed to the outcomes they bring about). I discuss two variants of this objection: first, that distributive theories (...) fail to account for the importance of how institutions cause good shortfalls and, second, that they fail to account for the normative attitude of social and political institutions expressed in different ways of treating people. The article argues that the causal variant of the objection has only very limited reach, and endorses the expressive variant: the attitudes expressed by institutions in their treatment of persons, such as contempt or neglect, generate potentially unjust social relationships and hierarchies. This should be the focus of a relational egalitarian approach to social justice. The article proceeds to explain how it is possible that artificial agents such as institutions have attitudes and how these attitudes are not reducible to those of the individuals that sustain them, and argues that distributive theories cannot be so modified as to account for such attitudes. It concludes by indicating several directions for the development of more worked-out conceptions of relational equality on this basis. (shrink)

This article lays out a capabilities and justice-based approach to the development of adaptation policy. While many theories of climate justice remain focused on ideal theories for global mitigation, the argument here is for a turn to just adaptation, using a capabilities framework to encompass vulnerability, social recognition, and public participation in policy responses. This article argues for a broadly defined capabilities approach to climate justice, combining a recognition of the vulnerability of basic needs with a process for public involvement. (...) Such an approach can be used to engage stakeholders with varied perceptions of what is at risk, and to develop priorities for adaptation policy. It addresses both individual and community-level vulnerabilities, and acknowledges that the conditions of justice depend on a functioning, even if shifting, environment. (shrink)

The influences of family, religion, and social, cultural, and economic discourses are deeply inscribed in the practices of young people. This article argues that by tracing ‘small stories’ through their accounts, we can make visible ‘big issues’ in their world views, and come to a better understanding of the complexities of their subjectification processes. Poststructural inquiry and critical discourse analysis are used to frame and analyse the positionings of a small group of 16-year-olds to show how they use ‘small stories’ (...) to mount arguments and counterarguments, introduce ‘theories’, and gain support for their views. Their interactions provide as much insight into their identities as what they actually say; therefore, both content and interaction are key analytical foci. These findings have implications for how we choose sections of interviews for fine-grained textual analysis. (shrink)

This article defends an ethics of care approach to global justice, which begins with an empirically informed account of injustices resulting from the workings and effects of contemporary neo-liberalism and hegemonic masculinities. Dominant distributive approaches to global justice see the unequal distribution of resources or ?primary goods? as the basic source of injustice. Crucially, however, most of these liberal theories do not challenge the basic structural and ideational ?frames? that govern the global political economy. Instead, they seek to ?correct? unjust (...) patterns of distribution according to an ideal theory. Subjects in these theories are generally understood as abstract, autonomous and impartial; this is in contrast to an ethics of care, which starts with an ontology of the subject as embodied, vulnerable and relational. The first part of this article explores the role and nature of theory in relation to the task of considering injustice on a global scale and offers a critique of the narrow focus in traditional theories of justice on the distribution of ?primary goods?. The second part considers the effects of neo-liberal globalization and hegemonic masculinities on global working families in order to illustrate the relationship between care and global justice. The final section sketches out a care-ethics approach to global injustice, focusing on three features: first, care as a relational approach; second, the focus in care ethics on intersecting structures of injustice; and third, care as a multi-scalar approach to global injustice. (shrink)

This article argues that the Bakhtin Circle presents a more realistic theory of concrete dialogue than the theory of discourse elaborated by Habermas. The Bakhtin Circle places speech within the “concrete whole utterance” and by this phrase they mean that the study of everyday language should be analyzed through the mediations of historical social systems such as capitalism. These mediations are also characterized by a determinate set of contradictions—the capital-labor contradiction in capitalism, for example—that are reproduced in unique ways in (...) more concrete forms of life (the state, education, religion, culture, and so on). Utterances always dialectically refract these processes and as such are internal concrete moments, or concrete social forms, of them. Moreover, new and unrepeatable dialogic events arise in these concrete social forms in order to overcome and understand the constant dialectical flux of social life. But this theory of dialogue is different from that expounded by Habermas, who tends to explore speech acts by reproducing a dualism between repeatable and universal “abstract” discursive processes (commonly known as the ideal speech situation) and empirical uses of discourse. These critical points against Habermas are developed by focusing on six main areas: sentences and utterances; the lifeworld and background language; active versus passive understandings of language; validity claims; obligation and relevance in language; and dialectical universalism. (shrink)

Recently several philosophers have argued that racial, gender, and other social generic generalizations should be avoided given their propensity to promote essentialist thinking, obscure the social nature of categories, and contribute to oppression. Here I argue that a general prohibition against social generics goes too far. Given that the truth of many generics require regularities or systematic rather than mere accidental correlations, they are our best means for describing structural forms of violence and discrimination. Moreover, their accuracy, their persistence in (...) the face of counterexamples, and features of the contemporary socio-political context make generics useful linguistic tools in social justice projects. (shrink)

Hate speech is one of the most important conceptual categories in anti‐oppression politics today; a great deal of energy and political will is devoted to identifying, characterizing, contesting, and penalizing hate speech. However, despite the increasing inclusion of gender identity as a socially salient trait, antipatriarchal politics has largely been absent within this body of scholarship. Figuring out how to properly situate patriarchy‐enforcing speech within the category of hate speech is therefore an important politico‐philosophical project. My aim in this article (...) is twofold: first, I argue that sexist speech, though oppressive, is not hate speech. Second, I argue that misogynistic speech is hate speech, even when it is intradivisional. This is important because recognizing that the concepthate speechapplies to certain forms of patriarchy‐enforcing speech is another step in clarifying what is wrong with the practice, and how bad it is in relation to other abuses. Consequently, this article provides a more nuanced account of the kinds of expressions that can and should count as instances of hate speech. (shrink)

In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...) in their own privileged racial specificity, and they misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. Such misrecognition preserves the cultural imperialism of Australia’s dominant social imaginary—a means of oppression that perpetuates epistemic insensitivity.Bringing this dual misrecognition to light best captures the indignity that is suffered by the victims of the aforementioned epistemic injustices. I argue that it is only when we truly recognize difference in its own terms, shifting the dominant social imaginary, that “mainstream Australians”can do their part in bringing about a just society. (shrink)

Social justice has been a central normative component of U.S. social welfare and social work for over a century, although the meaning and implications of the term have often been ambiguous. A major source of this ambiguity lies in the conflict between universalist views of social justice and those which focus on achieving justice for specific groups. This conflict has been masked by several long-standing assumptions about the relationship between social justice and multiculturalism – assumptions which have been challenged by (...) recent developments. The assumption that the pursuit of social justice requires the creation of a more egalitarian society has been challenged by the new political-economic realities of globalization. The assumption that the maintenance of individual rights complements the pursuit of social equality has been challenged by racially-based attacks on social welfare benefits and civil rights. Most significantly, the assumption that a socially just society is one in which different groups share a compatible vision of social justice has been challenged by the realities of multiculturalism. This paper explores the evolution of four themes regarding the relationship between social justice and multiculturalism during the past century and discusses their implications for the contemporary demographic and cultural context of the U.S. These themes are: the relationship of cultural diversity to the nation’s values and goals; the contradiction between coerced cultural assimilation and coerced physical and social segregation; the relationship between individual and group identity and rights; and the linkage between “Americanization” and the equal application of justice. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a proliferation of partnerships between business and government, multilateral bodies, and/or social actors such as NGOs and local community organizations engaged in promoting development. While proponents hail these partnerships as an important new approach to engaging business, critics argue that they are not only generally ineffective but also serve to legitimate a neo-liberal, global economic order which inhibits development. In order to understand and evaluate the role of such partnerships, it is necessary (...) to appreciate their diversity with respect to not only the activities that they engage in, but also the degree to which they are subject to social control. This paper distinguishes four different types of business partnerships, based upon differing degrees of social control: conventional business; corporate social responsibility; corporate accountability; and social economy. Each type of partnership is described, their basic forms are noted, and the conditions and prospects for them contributing to development are examined. By way of conclusion, an analysis is offered of how the different types of business partnerships relate to different conceptions of development and function as policy paradigms to promote different globalization agendas. (shrink)

This article will present the argument for treating democratic states as moral and not only legal collective entities; that is, it will apply the theory of collective rights of cultural groups in a (closed) domestic political setting to democratic states in international relations. Numerous experiences by self-identifying cultural groups bear witness to the fact that morally important objectives are not always reached by merely treating individuals as the sole bearers of moral status. In order to prevent latent cultural imperialism, many (...) countries around the world have adopted various models of collective rights protection and policies of preferential treatment for these groups. This article will examine whether it is possible to make a parallel between cultural groups and democratic states; in particular, whether it is feasible to think of democratic states as moral entities and what the normative implications of such a view for contemporary international relations and trade would be. (shrink)

In this article, I show that the intersection between education policy and immigration law in the United States sustains a permanent underclass and reinforces the deliberate disenfranchisement of students without authorized immigration status. I critically analyze the Supreme Court case Plyler s. Doe, and I suggest the DREAM Act as a means for these students to secure a right to rights for economic, social, and political agency. At the heart of the argument is my assertion that domiciled residency ought to (...) ensure these students? right to educational equity within the United States, from preschool through postsecondary levels. Throughout, I reflect on the amassing group of well-educated students, whose papers are diplomas, and who increasingly make apparent the futility of citizenship status for demarcating possibilities for mobile border crossing?not only territorial borders, but also the walls built up to obstruct class and social border crossings. (shrink)

Social justice has been identified as a foundational moral commitment for global health research ethics. Yet what a commitment to social justice means for community engagement in such research has not been critically examined. This paper draws on the rich social justice literature from political philosophy to explore the normative question: What should the ethical goals of community engagement be if it is to help connect global health research to social justice? Five ethical goals for community engagement are proposed that (...) promote well-being, agency, and self-development, particularly for those considered disadvantaged and marginalized. The paper also considers how key terms used in the proposed goals should be defined using existing theories of health and social justice. This analysis is done to give global health researchers and their partners a better idea of what the ethical goals mean. Patterns of convergence amongst different theories are identified that support relying on particular definitions of key terms. (shrink)

Universal health coverage is often implemented within countries through several national insurance schemes that collectively cover their populations. Yet the extent of services and benefits available can vary substantially between different schemes. This paper argues that these variations in coverage comprise tiering and then reviews different accounts of health and social justice that consider whether and when a tiered health system is fair. Using these accounts, it shows that the fairness of tiering can be determined by assessing whether differences in (...) coverage mean enrolees under some national insurance schemes do not achieve sufficient health or normal functioning and/or feel inferior relative to those belonging to other national insurance schemes. The paper further contends that these determinations of fairness should involve the people covered by different insurance schemes. Key universal health coverage questions to involve the public in answering are: Do the sum of differences between the schemes in your country generate feelings of unequal moral worth and/or mean enrolees struggle to achieve sufficient health or normal functioning? Which specific differences between health insurance schemes generate the greatest feelings of unequal moral worth in individuals? Which specific differences generate the greatest barriers to individuals achieving sufficient health or normal functioning? Rather than identifying which services to extend coverage to first, answering these questions will identify which disparities in services and benefits are the most morally urgent to address. Finally, some initial thoughts are offered on who from the public should be involved in making these decisions and how they might be involved as a matter of justice. (shrink)

Global health research partnerships are increasingly taking the form of consortia of institutions from high-income countries and low- and middle-income countries that undertake programs of research. These partnerships differ from collaborations that carry out single projects in the multiplicity of their goals, scope of their activities, and nature of their management. Although such consortia typically aim to reduce health disparities between and within countries, what is required for them to do so has not been clearly defined. This article takes a (...) conceptual approach to explore how the governance of transnational global health research consortia should be structured to advance health equity. To do so, it applies an account called shared health governance to derive procedural and substantive guidance. A checklist based on this guidance is proposed to assist research consortia determine where their governance practices strongly promote equity and where they may fall short. (shrink)

Critical Race Theory (CRT) has its origins in legal analysis but increasingly has been used by educational researchers to analyse the continued salience of institutional racism in educational settings. After providing a brief overview of the history of CRT and the educational issues addressed by critical race theorists, I review two books that explicitly engage critical race theory (CRT). Delgado and Stefancic’s (2001) primer on the CRT literature provides an important backdrop for situating Guinier and Torres’ (2002) ambitious argument for (...) building grassroots social movements around the concept of political race. (shrink)

Many legal scholars well recognize that, in some instances, support for a law or policy may be primarily because of its expressive function, i.e. the statements it makes about underlying values. In these cases, the expressive content of a law or policy may actually overshadow its central purpose. Examples of this phenomenon, according to Cass Sunstein, include, for example, regulations against hate speech in the USA. He suggests that achieving the consequence (prohibiting hateful speech against certain groups) may not be (...) the real focus (central purpose) of the law. Rather, the real focus is on the social meaning of these regulations—that bigotry is unacceptable in a liberal society. In this way, a particular law or policy can operate on many levels—while aiming to achieve a particular objective or behavior, it can also be a valuable tool for achieving other important social goals through its expressive function. This article applies this insight to the realm of public health policy, with particular attention to the case of pandemic planning, and suggests that public health policy and its overall goals may be well-served by deliberate regard for, and appropriate utilization of, the expressive function. (shrink)

In past work, Habermas has claimed that justice and solidarity stand in a complementary relationship—that ‘ethical’ relations of solidarity are the ‘reverse side’ of justice. Yet in a recent address to the World Congress of Philosophy, he rejects this idea. This paper argues against this rejection. After explaining the idea, arguing for its centrality to Habermas' thought, and evaluating Habermas' scant reflections on this major transformation, I argue that his rejection of the idea is a result of a newfound skepticism (...) about the power of secular reason, and should thus be understood in terms of his corresponding turn to religious traditions as alternative sources of solidarity. I argue against this ‘religious turn’ by developing an alternative advocated by Habermas himself in earlier reflections—attention to real sociopolitical movements. In particular, I analyze feminist and black liberation movements to demonstrate that Habermas' pessimism about secular sources of justice-producing solidarity is unwarranted, and that, while ‘postsecular’ sources may provide one avenue for actionable solidarity, they are not the only one. I conclude by identifying a conceptual commonality in these two alternatives: an inclusive conception of what it means to be human. (shrink)

I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: ‘I destroy, I destroy, I destroy…’Context: The ‘linguistic turn’ of Western philosophy ; and correlatively, the decline of universalist discourses. The weariness with regard to ‘theory’, and the miserable slackening that goes along with it. The time has come to philosophize.…there is no danger of philosophy's ‘coming to an end’. Religion did not come to an end in the Enlightenment, nor painting in Impressionism. Even if the period from Plato (...) to Nietzsche is encapsulated and ‘distanced’ in the way Heidegger suggests, and even if twentieth‐century philosophy comes to seem a stage of awkward transitional backing and filling, there will be something called ‘philosophy’ on the other side of the transition. (shrink)

Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...) that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Is deliberative democracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second? (shrink)

The main goal of critical social justice is to ensure the agency of citizens, which enables them to take part, not only in public discussions about how resources are distributed, but also about matters such as what should be produced, how to do it and through what kind of production, among others. Critical social justice can be best formulated within the foundation programme of discursive ethics, in particular within Apel's version specified in his principle of co-responsibility. This principle establishes a (...) telos that operates as a normative guide to formulate the constructive question about which the necessary conditions are for someone to be able to become a subject of dialogue. Answering this question leads, on the one hand, to the development of some constitutive elements of critical social justice and, on the other hand, to the identification of the social relations and structures that undermine the possibilities of a person to effectively participate in the discussion of the topics they consider relevant. As its constitutive elements, I propose reciprocal recognition autonomy, the metric of capabilities and a sufficientarian principle of justice, which work together with the well-known difference principle. These elements constitute a normative net that allows contemporary societies to be criticized from the perspective of justice. (shrink)

In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi defends classical-liberal principles not because of real-world considerations but on ideal-theoretic grounds. However, what constitutes a sufficiently “ideal” ideal theory is debatable since, as Tomasi shows, regimes that range from laissez faire to heavily interventionist can all be classified as legitimate from the perspective of ideal theory. Conversely, if ideal theory can allow for realistic constraints, as Rawls does, then we should recognize that even under ideal-theoretic conditions, political actors face logistical, epistemic, and motivational (...) challenges that only intensify in the real world, where questions of feasibility become paramount. (shrink)

Anti-commodification theorists condemn liberal political philosophers for not being able to justify restricting a market transaction on the basis of what is sold, but only on the basis of how it is sold. The anti-commodification theorist is correct that if this were all the liberal had to say in the face of noxious markets, it would be inadequate: even if everyone has equal bargaining power and no one is misled, there are some goods that should not go to the highest (...) bidder. In this paper, I respond to the anti-commodification critique of liberalism by arguing that the political liberal has the wherewithal to account not only for the conditions under which goods should not be sold, but also for what kinds of goods should not be for sale in a market economy. The political liberal can appeal to a principle of equal basic rights, and to one of sufficiency in basic needs and the social bases of self-respect, I argue, to account for what’s problematic about markets in civic goods, necessary goods, and physical goods including body parts and intimate services. (shrink)

This paper seeks to discover if urban planning has any 'internal values' which might help guide its practitioners and provide standards with which to judge their works, thereby providing for some disciplinary autonomy. After arguing that such values can best be discovered through an examination of the history of utopian urban planning, I examine one period in that history, the early Renaissance and, in particular, the work of Leon Battista Alberti. Against Susan Lang's thesis that Alberti's work was guided by (...) the fundamental value of beauty, I argue that Alberti was centrally concerned to design cities that would help their citizens develop civic virtue. Against Françoise Choay's thesis that Alberti was not a utopian, I argue that Alberti was a procedural utopian interested in advancing certain political goals. This analysis suggests that urban planning has an internal value structure which includes some specific political values. (shrink)

This paper will consider the role of schools, as a particular moral habitat in the formation of moral virtues and how the inculcation of a comprehensive private moral system of beliefs, values and practices leads to public values in a multicultural, pluralist society. It is argued that the formation of good persons ensures the formation of good citizens and that governments should therefore support good moral education rather than seek to impose national public values or to concentrate on developing good (...) citizens only. The recognition that moral values are learnt within particular private moral systems of values, that it is these on which common public values rely for support and that there are a variety of such comprehensive private moral systems also means that a variety of schools need to be supported. One condition which such schools need to fulfil is that the comprehensive private moral system of beliefs which they inculcate in their students is based on a recognition of the universal applicability of the moral principles that they endorse. (shrink)

In Democracy and Moral Conflict, Robert Talisse defends a folk epistemological justification of democracy. This is a universalist and non-moral justification that he deems necessary to accommodate moral pluralism. In contrast, I argue that this attempt fails to justify democracy, on three grounds. First, democracy cannot accommodate moral pluralism, as Talisse understands it. Second, Talisse's own conception of democracy is inconsistent with moral pluralism. And third, democracy requires moral justification and motivation, both of which can be made consistent from within (...) an experimental moral pluralism. (shrink)

In 1971, Chicano activist Armando Réndon began to chart new directions for Chicana/o politics that move away from a narrow emphasis on cultural and ethnic nationalism. He argues that urban Chicana/o neighborhoods ought develop community-based organizations to provide support services for residents and to advocate local concerns to elected officials. In the first part of this essay, I reconstruct Réndon's concept of a 'barrio union' as an example of participatory democracy. I situate his concept of neighborhood democracy within Mexican American (...) and Progressive movement history, and then highlight contemporary experiments with this model that are particularly successful in transforming traditionally marginalized individuals into active democratic participants. I then suggest that the barrio union is a repository of cultural, ethical, and political ideals that might be used by progressive Chicana/o activists to challenge the meaning of dominant institutions and political traditions within the United States, particularly the ways in which we conceive of race and American citizenship. (shrink)

Brian Barry's Culture and Equality is probably the most powerful liberal egalitarian critique of multiculturalism addressing the pathologies of recognizing difference of ethnicity, religion, race, and culture. In this essay, I examine Barry's approach to the law, which underpins his theory of egalitarianism to determine whether it is enough — as Barry thinks it is — to insist on either applying the same law for everyone so that exemptions are foreclosed in general, or repealing the law since the case for (...) its existence is not justified. I find that Barry's effort is inadequate. Because the conditions for exemptions are not specified, exemptions are merely defensible, not just. Using the headscarf controversy in France to illustrate why Barry's approach backfires, I argue how enforcing the same law for all leads to undermining the very politics of redistribution that Barry champions. (shrink)

The welfare state was characterised by two central principles: universality and equality.It can be argued that the development of education in New Zealand was shaped and maintained by both these ideals.The public benefits of education were not, however, simply the sum of individual private benefits, for norms such as political or civic tolerance, literacy, or the values required for democratic functioning adhere to the quality of a community and are not reducible to, or contained in, the psychological characteristics of individuals.The (...) early New Zealand educators claimed that in order that public benefits might be derived from schooling, and as an essential precondition of citizenship, all children should receive an education with common features whether they lived in town or in rural districts, whether they were rich or poor, black or white, and irrespective of their religion or their cultural practices.As Fraser expressed it in 1939:The government's objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, whatever the level of his academic ability, whether he be rich or poor, whether he live in town or country, has a right as a citizen to a free education of a kind for which he is best fitted and to the fullest extent of his powers. (shrink)

The pace of globalisation has quickened considerably in the last ten to fifteen years. The process has yielded benefits but also resulted in conflicts. The benefits would be enhanced if the conflicts could be resolved. One source of conflicts is the desire to maintain cultural identity. Can Confucianism contribute to the working out of a universal global justice that can help resolve conflicts, particularly conflicts of cultural identities? Can it be part of the globalisation process without sacrificing its cultural identity? (...) I argue that it can on both counts and thus it is neither a villain blocking the progress of universal justice, a necessary condition for conflict-free globalisation, nor a helpless victim of that progress. (shrink)