This article investigates how Plato thinks we secure necessary motivational conditions for inquiry. After presenting a typology of zetetic breakdowns in the dialogues, I identify norms of inquiry Plato believes all successful inquirers must satisfy. Satisfying these norms requires trust that philosophy will not harm but benefit inquirers overall. This trust cannot be secured by protreptic argument. Instead, it requires divine intervention—an extra-rational foundation for rational inquiry.

In this thesis I shall argue (1) that for Plato ‘moral’ education, rightly understood (or ‘Platonic education’ as I shall call it), can be an effective method for cultivating virtue in non-ideal societies; (2) that Platonic education is a process that occurs (or Plato hopes might occur) through an engagement with some of the dialogues; (3) that Platonic education strongly mirrors Sokratic discourse in its aims; (4) that Plato’s whole approach to education should be understood mainly from the context of (...) the problem of teaching virtue in imperfect societies; (5) that Plato intends some of the dialogues to serve as a propaedeutic for a possible education in virtue and not as a method for creating fully virtuous people. Lastly, (6) Platonic education is primarily concerned with human virtue, and insofar as it can support a notion or notions of civic virtue, it cannot do so unequivocally. The evidence for these claims is found not chiefly in the educational programmes and theories of the Republic and the Laws but in a number of techniques, such as protreptic rhetoric, life-models, argumentation, and myth, which Plato employs in some of the dialogues. Platonic education is specifically designed to function in imperfect societies. With this in mind therefore, an additional concern of this thesis is with whether we could imagine any of Plato’s educational principles or techniques being used to improve moral education today. (shrink)