This paper is an attempt to build a bridge between the fields of social cognition and social ontology. Drawing on both classical and more recent phenomenological studies, the article develops an account ofgroup-directed empathy. The first part of the article spells out the phenomenological notion of empathy and suggests certain conceptual distinctions vis-à-vis two different kinds of group. The second part of the paper applies these conceptual considerations to cases in which empathy is directed at groups and elucidates the sense (...) in which individuals can empathically target not only other individual’s emotions, but also shared emotions as such. Clarifying the structure of group-directed empathy, it will also be argued that the latter is, by default, more informative than individual-directed empathy. The third and last section of the paper is devoted to one central consequence of the proposed account: if it is possible to empathize with groups as such, and if empathy necessary builds on body-perception, then both ideas seem to be conducive to the claim that groups as such have a body. (shrink)

RESUMEN Considerando que los estudios sobre la intersubjetividad en Husserl deben ir más allá del camino cartesiano, D. Zahavi propone ir "más allá de la empatía" y profundizar en el concepto husserliano de "constitución". Para demostrar que la dimensión intersubjetiva no depende del encuentro con otro sujeto, sino que pertenece a priori a la subjetividad, este autor esclarece la dependencia de la intencionalidad de horizonte respecto de la intersubjetividad trascendental. Se analiza en qué sentido es posible establecer esta dependencia y (...) se evalúa la viabilidad general del intento de ir "más allá de la empatía" en el tratamiento fenomenológico de la alteridad. ABSTRACT Convinced that studies on intersubjectivity in Husserl should depart from the Cartesian path, D. Zahavi proposes going "beyond empathy" and focusing on the Husserlian concept of "constitution". In order to demonstrate that the intersubjective dimension does not depend on the encounter with another subject but is rather an a priori component of subjectivity, Zahavi clarifies the dependency of horizonintentionality on transcendental intersubjectivity. The paper analyzes how it is possible to establish such a dependency and evaluates the general viability of the attempt to go "beyond empathy" in the phenomenological study of alterity. (shrink)

I examine the role of mutual gaze in social cognition. I start by discussing recent studies of joint visual attention in order to show that social cognition is operative in infancy prior to the emergence of theoretical skills required to make judgments about other people's states of mind. Such social cognition depends on the communicative potential inherent in human bodies. I proceed to examine this embodied social cognition in the context of Merleau-Ponty's views on vision. I expose some inner difficulties (...) within Merleau-Ponty's position as well as to point out the ways of resolving them by means of combined insights from developmental psychology and the analyses of self-other relations from philosophies of dialogue. (shrink)

The review is devoted to a joint monograph of Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values published in 2019. The peculiarity and novelty of this monograph is that it is devoted not so much to the cognitive and epistemological aspects of phenomenology of intersubjectivity as to ethical, existential and value problems of relations with the Others, presented in various phenomenological concepts. One of the advantages of the work is the pluralistic approach, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the solutions (...) to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by a number of the most prominent phenomenologists, i. e. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Levinas and others. The book traces the idea that emerging of the topic of intersubjectivity in phenomenology caused a socio-ethical and axiological shift in the phenomenological movement. Considering moving of modern philosophy towards “the intersubjective paradigm”, the aim of the authors of the monograph to show the relevance and innovation of phenomenology in discussing the problems of the Other, communication and ethics can be assessed as a promising theoretical project. Whereas critics of the phenomenological movement reproached “methodological solipsism” of phenomenology, which develops Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, a serious analysis of the works of the most prominent representatives of the phenomenological tradition leads the authors of the monograph to the conclusion that a phenomenological subject is social in its essence. The review draws a conclusion that the joint monograph brings into sharp focus that phenomenology is in possession of deep and diverse ways of studying the common being of people and collectively shared values. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger’s account of ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger ; (...) namely that because the body is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, embodiment, rather than stressing the immediacy of experience, is insufficiently acknowledged in his emphasis on ‘being-in-the-world’. Through placing Gallagher and Jacobson’s accounts of intersubjectivity and the body alongside Heidegger’s accounts of Mitsein and Leib, this article shows Heidegger’s radical position on the body as immersed in a holistic environment, and its reverberations on his account of intersubjectivity. I argue that Dasein’s embodied engagement in the world is always one of immediacy and that the body of the other is perceived as ‘tied into’ its context, as well. In so doing, I offer an Heideggerian account of ecstatic involvement which moves away from the distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity toward an immediate engagement with objects and people always already ‘tied into’ a context; an account that, through the concept of Fürsorge, includes shifts of attention between objects and people that allow for the ethical distinctions Gallagher and Jacobson are looking for. (shrink)

Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...) article is to address both problems, by offering an understanding “from the inside”. Our phenomenological approach is a form of “radical empathy”, and crosses the Jaspersian limits of understanding. It compares delusional experiences with variations of reality experience in everyday life, and makes use of the structure of imagination. Six factors influencing the experience of reality are discussed and illustrated by clinical and non-clinical examples. These factors are: continuity, materiality and resistance, multiplicity of sensations and perceptions, intensity, the sense of authorship, and the complex role of intersubjectivity. I suggest that experiences of hypo- and hyperreality are not restricted to pathology, but have their place in everyday life as well. Delusional phenomena can be better understood by investigating the interplay of these six factors. With this framework, the two complex phenomena consequently prove to be better understandable to us. Our approach remains within the phenomenal experience and might thereby contribute to the validity of psychopathology. (shrink)

This article investigates the origins of the experiences involved in the diagnostics (detection and normative evaluation) of biological entities in image-based medical praxis. Our specific research aim presupposes a vast discussion regarding the origins of knowledge in general, but is narrowed down to the alternatives of anthropomorphism and biomorphism. Accordingly, in the subsequent chapters we will make an attempt to investigate and illustrate what holds the diagnostic experiential situation together—biological regularities, manifestation via movement, conscious synthesis, causal categories, or something else. (...) We argue that as long as knowledge originates out of practices, a promising way forward is to oscillate between the prominent although controversial ideas of the history of philosophy and observations of concrete human practices, such as, in our chosen example, image-based medical diagnostics of biological pathologies. Although a number of thinkers are involved in the discussion, Aristotle and Husserl are most important here as the representatives of historical paradigms on the matter. The body in this research was not taken solely as the physical entity (Körper) but rather as a transcendental, constitutive structure where diagnostic and biological processes synchronize in teleological movement (Leib). However, philosophical speculations are illustrated by actual radiograms, the interpretation of which brings us back to the aforementioned question of primacy regarding cognition. (shrink)

Wellner’s article aims at changing an essential element within phenomenology by introducing the idea of digital imagination. Assuming her thesis, I aim to raise two possible kinds of questions generated by the introduction of a technologically embedded imagination which is externalized.

This dissertation contributes to the philosophy of empathy and biomedical ethics by drawing on phenomenological approaches to empathy, intersubjectivity, and affectivity in order to contest the primacy of the intersubjective aspect of empathy at the cost of its affective aspect. Both aspects need to be explained in order for empathy to be accurately understood in philosophical works, as well as practically useful for patient care in biomedical ethics. In the first chapter, I examine the current state of clinical empathy in (...) medicine including professional opinions about empathy, the dominant definition being employed, and the problems that arise from this definition. By trying to define empathy in a way that is useful to the current presuppositions in medicine, clinical empathy aligns with simulation theory, which has three problems: the discrepancy between the way empathy is defined and the way it is explained, the lack of diversity that this theory of empathy allows in our understanding of others, and the lack of affective understanding and affective engagement involved in the patient-physician interaction. These three problems are used to derive three questions that are important for any theory of empathy: (1) What is the phenomenon being explained? (2) What is the intersubjective context of empathy? (3) What is the affective dimension of empathy? The best theory of clinical empathy can be formulated by answering these three questions as they relate to phenomenological theories, which are more attuned to overcoming presuppositions. Chapters two and three each examine a different phenomenological approach to empathy from opposite extremes in their theories of intersubjectivity. Husserl and Stein begin from an isolated, transcendental subject that needs empathy to bridge the gap between itself and others, while Scheler begins from a primary intersubjectivity in which self and other are undifferentiated, making empathy a largely unnecessary skill. Despite their strongly opposed positions, and the acknowledgement that their theories of intersubjectivity necessitate their theories of empathy, I argue that both fail to understand the affective dimension of empathy. Husserl and Stein leave no room in empathy for it to be an affect, while Scheler prioritizes affects that reunite subjects, but leaves empathy itself as a non-affective skill. Chapter four explains Gallagher’s interaction theory as a more moderate approach to the relation between empathy and intersubjectivity. He draws on the insights of the other two theories, but conceives of empathy as a multi-leveled phenomenon that allows for an understanding of others. While this theory does aid in addressing the intersubjective context of empathy in a way that best solves the first two problems with clinical empathy, interaction theory still fails to fully address the affectivity of empathy, maintaining empathy as a largely cognitive ability. Gallagher does acknowledge the affective core of empathy, but he does not explain the way in which it is affective. In response to this problem, I explain Anya Daly’s application of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of reversibility to affectivity as a possible solution to the problematic gap in Gallagher’s theory. Chapter five focuses on theories of clinical empathy in order to address the neglected affective aspects of empathy, and respond to the problem of detached concern. The problems caused by detached concern are explained, as well as why the theories discussed in the middle chapters are still unable to solve them. This is done in two parts. In the first part, I explain the basis of this issue in the cognitive/feeling divide, as explained in the philosophy of emotion. Then, I give a brief overview of the phenomenology of affectivity to be used as a guide to the affectivity of empathy. In the second part, I examine three theories of clinical empathy that attempt to solve the problem of detached concern, noting their strengths and weaknesses based on their similarities to phenomenological approaches to empathy and affectivity. (shrink)

The article investigates the possibilities of phenomenology to contribute to the study of animal behaviour, and, respectively, asks how and on what grounds phenomenology can benefit from the research done within empirical sciences. The theoretical point of departure is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior and the essay "The Metaphysical in Man".

It is commonly presupposed that there are no decisive differences between empathy with fictional characters on one hand and empathy with real persons on the other. I distinguish two types of processes of affect recognition "Perceptual Affect Recognition" and "Affective Affect Recognition". The consensus view about empathy with fictional characters has to be challenged if "empathy" refers to the former or the latter process because of the significant differences between the fictional and the non-fictional scenario: firstly, readers as "empathizers" cannot (...) perceive the fictional target person directly but only the literary text. This is especially problematic for Affective State Recognition. Secondly, fictional characters do not exist, at least not in the sense that they are real people or entities with mental states which leads to relevant differences of the accuracy conditions of Affective Affect Recognition in the fictional and the nonfictional scenario. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of the emotions in Edith Stein’s early work On the Problem of Empathy. After presenting her work embedded in the tradition of the early phenomenology of the emotions, I shall elaborate the four dimensions of the emotional experience according to this authoress, the link between emotions and values and the phenomenon of the living body. I argue that Stein’s account on empathy remains incomplete as long as we ignore the complex phenomenology of emotions (...) underlying her work. (shrink)

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained (...) in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all? (shrink)

In professional medical ethics, the physician traditionally is obliged to fulfil specific duties as well as to embody a responsible and trustworthy personality. In the public discussion, different concepts are suggested to describe the desired underlying attitude of physicians. In this article, one of them—empathy—is presented in an interpretation that is meant to depicture (together with the two additional concepts compassion and care) this attitude. Therefore empathy in the clinical context is defined as the adequate understanding of the inner processes (...) of the patient concerning his health-related problems. Adequacy is scrutinized on behalf of the emotional and subjective involvement of he physician, and on the necessary dependence on medical—moral—goals. In the present interpretation, empathy alone is no guarantee of the right moral attitude, but a necessary instrumental skill in order to perceive and treat a patient as an individual person. The concepts of compassion and care that will be discussed in two forthcoming articles are necessary parts to describe the desired moral attitude of the physician more completely. (shrink)

A critical commentary on the article “The Epistemic Harms of Empathy in Phenomenological Psychopathology” by Lucienne Spencer and Matthew Broome (2023) is presented. The authors committed the “fallacy of ambiguous or vague definition” by incorrectly interpreting Karl Jaspers’ conceptualizations, resulting in difficulties following logical arguments and arriving at reasonable conclusions. To overcome this fallacy, the commentary provides conceptual clarifications regarding Jaspers’ empathic understanding (einfühlendes Verstehen), conceived as the foundational concept of his project to develop a phenomenologically oriented psychopathology. Jaspers initially (...) introduced this concept in the article “Die phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie” [The Phenomenological Research Direction in Psychopathology], published in 1912, and extended in his magnum opus “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” [General Psychopathology], published in 1913. (shrink)

Purpose: This, the second part of a two-part paper, describes how the concerns of enactive cognitive science have been realized in actual research: methodological issues, proposed explanatory mechanisms and models, some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science, and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Despite some skepticism about "mechanisms" in constructivist literature, enactive cognitive science attempts to develop cognitive formalisms and models. Such techniques as feedback loops, self-organization, autocatalytic networks, and dynamical systems modeling are (...) used to develop alternatives to cognitivist models. A number of technical similarities are starting to emerge in the different models being proposed. Research Implications: The need to resolve the interplay between autonomy and coupling with the environment suggests the need for further technical research. And the reintroduction of first-person concerns into cognitive science raises some questions of method, particularly with regard to the relationship between first-person experience, neuroscience, and methods of description, analysis, and explanation. Results to date suggest that insights from enactive cognitive science could lead to innovations in the design of artifacts. (shrink)